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I. INTRODUCTION 
"On your mark. Get Set. GO!" yelled the coach, as he let go of the two 
young girls' shoulders, freeing them to run as fast as they could to the 
finish line. 
"Tie, " said the assistant coach as each girl slapped his outstretched 
hands. Mary and Annie (not their real names) smiled at each other, obvi-
ously pleased with their performances and their shared victory. After all, 
they were teammates and there was no particular glory in defeating your 
teammate. ·It was just a fun race. 
"Okay, girls. Let's do it again," yelled the coach "We need to see 
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who's the fastest. " 
The girls looked at each other, shrugged their shoulders, and reluc-
tantly trudged back down the field-hot, sweaty, and tired from their af-
ternoon of softball practice. Other parents and I watched as Mary and 
Annie came zooming down the grass toward the finish line for the second 
time. The determination on their faces left no doubt that they were both 
putting everything they had into the race; one of them was going to win 
this one. 
"Tie again, " screamed out the assistant coach, smiling in disbelief, 
but with obvious approval. Parents, also happy that the girls had both 
come up winners again, released their sighs and smiled at each other. The 
girls tried to catch their breath as they enjoyed another moment of shared 
victory as teammates. 
I called to Mary, my daughter, that it was time to go home, thinking 
that was the end of practice. But the coach wanted the girls to run yet a 
third race. . I thought it wasn't a good idea-it was getting late, the sun 
was setting, the girls were tired, and everybody was feeling good that they 
had tied twice, evidencing their equal running talent. 
"Why can 't we leave it at a tie? They're both super runners. Let them 
enjoy that, " I suggested. Other parents shared this sentiment. The coach 
either didn 't hear us or ignored us, because the third race was about to 
begin. The girls were overly tired and this was part of our motherly con-
cerns. But the races also had turned an afternoon of fun and camaraderie 
into an afternoon of anxiety and competition. Competing against each 
other, particularly with such intensity, was new and different and not in 
keeping with the spirit of the team. As parents, we understood that to con-
tinue to push for a winner was going to unnecessarily hurt the loser. Un-
comfortable with the coach 's decision, we stared at the starting line where 
the two girls were set for the third race. 
"Go! ", shouted the coach. 
"Too bad, " said the woman standing next me. "Mary got off to a late 
start. " I had noticed it, too, and was not surprised that Mary was a step 
behind Annie as they crossed the finished line. 
"Annie wins!" declared the assistant coach. Everyone approached 
the girls, congratulating them and remarking what great runners they both 
were. Within seconds of crossing the finish line, though, little eight-year-
old Mary turned around, pointed her finger at her coach and exclaimed, 
"You held me back. That wasn 'tfair. " 
I felt everything slow down, iike I was in a movie and the camera had 
just gone to slow speed. I couldn 't believe what I was witnessing: my 
daughter was too small-literally-to be challenging this huge man. And 
what was she saying to him? Was I hearing her correctly? In a split sec-
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ond, the dynamics of our softball community were drastically changed. 
Mary burst into tears and dropped to her knees in turmoil. "Why did 
you hold me that way?," she kept asking the coach between sobs. 
The coach became defensive and suggested Mary was lying. Parents 
and daughters lingered around, waiting to see what would happen. They 
turned to me with this look that told me I was supposed to calm down 
Mary, apologize for her "insulting" behavior, and smooth things over so 
we could all go home feeling okay about seeing each other at the next 
game. 
But I knew I couldn 't say anything to make the situation okay. In fact, 
my experiences with my daughter have taught me that she probably . was 
not mistaken about being held back. She is often treated unfairly because 
of her race and she is the only Black person on the softball team. In fact, 
as soon as Mary made her comment to the coach, I thought, "So that ex-
plains it. Here we go again. " 
"But why would I hold your daughter back? " The coach seemed to be 
getting even bigger than he was when my daughter confronted him, as he 
angrily stomped toward me. 
Of course, I didn't know the answer to this question--at least, not as 
an epistemological matter. On some level, it made no sense that the coach 
would intentionally give Annie a head-start. On the other hand, maybe he 
was just as tired as the girls, realized this third race wasn't such a good 
idea after all, and he just wanted a winner and arbitrarily picked one, 
perhaps without even being aware that he was treating Mary unfairly. 
Like everyone else witnessing the incident, perhaps like most people 
reading this story, I wanted there to be a reason unrelated to Mary's 
blackness and everyone else's whiteness for my daughter's accusation that 
she had been held back. In my heart, though, I knew she had been treated 
unfairly because she is Black, but I kept my opinion to myself I could not 
say what I was thinking because my proffered explanation would be a se-
rious affront, which I could not prove and which would make everyone 
even angrier at my daughter who was already perceived to be a sore loser. 
As other parents collected their belongings, the coach and I continued 
our increasingly heated argument. He admonished that I needed to teach 
my daughter how to lose. Before I could respond to this personal attack, 
my daughter interrupted us, tears continuing to stream down her cheeks: 
"I know how to lose, Coach. I lose all the time. But the game has to be 
fair. Let 's do it again. I know if you don 't hold me, I know I could tie her. 
I know I could tie her again if it was fair. " Mary was demanding justice 
and significantly, she was not concerned with winning. 
No more footraces, I thought. This whole thing has gotten out of con-
trol. But I was proud of my daughter for standing up to her coach. 
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Clearly, she wasn 't a sore loser, she wasn 't even interested in winning; 
she was simply asking to be treated fairly. I looked at the coach and said, 
"I wish there was something I could say that would help you understand " 
"Hey, if you don 't like my coaching, then why don't you put her on 
another team? That would be fine with me. Go ahead Quit. " he invited, 
getting in the last word before walking away. 
My daughter cried for hours after we got home, struggling to under-
stand why her coach would betray her and then get so angry about it when 
she expressed her feelings. 
* * * 
Many people, especially Whites, may doubt that the footrace incident 
had anything to do with race, thinking my perception is farfetched or that I 
am being overly sensitive, particularly as Mary's mother. Readers, espe-
cially Whites, may be asking the same question the coach angrily yelled at 
me: "But why would I hold your daughter back?" suggesting by the tone 
ofthe question that there is no reason he would do such a terrible thing. 
Six or seven years ago, I would have shared this sentiment, even 
though I was a White liberal who believed in racial equality. My com-
mitment to the Black Civil Rights Movement came at a very young age. I 
share this bit of my background in an attempt to express how deep my 
feelings are about the wrongness of racism and to emphasize that it was 
not until my daughter came into my life that I truly began to understand 
how profound and persistent racism is in our society. 
As a young girl, I remember visiting my grandparents in Alabama 
every summer and being forcefully admonished, in the vernacular of the 
day, never to cross the railroad tracks marking the outer boundary of their 
property because that would have put me in the Black neighborhood. I do 
not remember whether it was the word itself or the disdain with which it 
was spoken that disgusted me more. I have no idea why I felt this way, 
but I wanted to dissociate from people when they started "being ugly," as I 
called it. I did not even know the word "racism," let alone have any idea 
what it meant. But I think the real "moment of awareness" for me came 
when, as a young girl, I witnessed some White children beating up some 
Black children. Watching the Black children being hit overwhelmed me 
with sadness; I simply knew it was wrong. Visiting my grandparents 
brought mixed feelings from that moment on. I could not bear to listen to 
the ugliness or watch another beating and yet I wanted to cross those 
tracks. Again, I do not know why. Was it just because I was forbidden to? 
Did I think I could escape the ugliness and beatings, which were painful 
for me? Did I just want to play with the Black children? Was I the eight-
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year-old anthropologist who wanted to report back to my relatives that, 
"Yall've got it all wrong." I do not know why I wanted to cross the tracks, 
but the feelings about the wrongness of racism never went away; they be-
came even stronger. 
Dr. Martin Luther King's famous march from Selma to Montgomery, 
Alabama took place only miles from my grandparents' home when I was 
thirteen years old. Had I been older and had the resources, I would have 
been right in the thick of that march, which is where I was in 1987 as civil 
rights advocates marched on Forsyth County, Georgia to protest its exclu-
sion of Black residents; Moreover, my commitment to achieving racial 
equality for Blacks and all people of color motivated me to become a law-
yer and a law professor. My professional career centers around issues of 
racial equality: I teach, write, and give public speeches about it. My ef-
forts are designed to persuade Whites to join in the struggle for racial 
equality. 
Despite my life-long White liberalist commitment to racial equality, 
before my daughter and I became a family it probably would not have oc-
curred to me that the softball coach held my daughter back because she is 
Black. In fact, years ago, if I had witnessed a similar incident involving a 
White child and a Black child who was not my daughter, I may have 
thought what most of the White adults were thinking about my daughter-
that she exaggerated what happened. Years ago, I thought I had a keen 
grasp of racism and believed my knowledge would enable me to maneuver 
through racial incidents, successfully advocating for my daughter in the 
White world. I did not realize that my White liberal views on race and 
race relations were inadequate to comprehend how profound and pervasive 
racial inequality is in oursociety. In addition, my "goodwill," meaning 
that I did not think I had a prejudiced attitude, was evidenced by my com-
mitment to racial equality, and was also supposed to make me a non-racist 
ally in the colored world. Looking back, my White liberalism of my pre-
daughter days enabled me to understand the coach's and the other parents' 
inability to entertain my daughter's accusations. At one time, I suspect I 
shared with them a common view: We fashioned ourselves people of 
goodwill and people of goodwill would never lay a White hand of oppres-
sion on a Black child. 
The years with my daughter reveal that being a White person of 
goodwill is not good enough in the struggle to achieve racial equality. I 
am powerless to mediate the racial incidents involving my daughter. I 
think back to the afternoon of softball practice and try to imagine what I 
could have done differently to make the coach and parents understand the 
relevance of race to the situation. One thought, somewhat humorous, 
came from Professor Patricia Williams' story in which she was accused of 
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using too much critical race theory in the courtroom. 1 I imagined myself 
calling a truce with the coach and asking everyone to kindly take their 
seats in the bleachers; the lesson on critical race theory was about to begin: 
* * * 
Why would the coach hold my daughter back? Let's start with the con-
cept of unconscious racism. The mistreatment of my daughter by White 
authority figures comports with the phenomenon of "unconscious 
racism. "1 The coach's behavior may have been motivated by racism, a 
belief in the inferiority of Blacks compared to Whites. Naturally, none of 
us thinks of ourselves as racist-such an ugly word-and this is why the 
phenomenon is called "unconscious" racism. You, Coach, may not have 
realized this is what motivated you. Not that it did. (I don't want to make 
him even more defensive and therefore less open to hearing the lesson.) 
But it might have been the reason and that's worth thinking about. 
Now I realize that most of you probably think this is outrageous and 
believe I am reading too much into the incident. But my point is that the 
burden of defusing this incident rested on you, Coach. I realize you think 
Mary's accusation was unjustified, but it nevertheless called for a reflec-
tive response as opposed to a reflexive response of calling her a liar. A 
reflective response would have acknowledged Mary's feelings of betrayal, 
not just as an eight-year-old, but also as a Black child and the only Black 
child in our softball community. Critical race theory suggests that it was 
incumbent on you, Coach, primarily as the adult but also as the White 
authority figure, to dispel any notions that you were prejudiced against 
Mary because she is Black Specifically, it is her trust in you that is at 
issue. If you had said you were sorry that she felt mistreated (assuming 
you did not mistreat her), reassured her that you want to be fair to all the 
girls, and promised that she and Annie could run again at the next prac-
tice if they wanted to, perhaps such a reflective response would have 
eliminated any misunderstandings, especially any misunderstandings that 
you treated her unfairly because she is Black. Rather than becoming de-
fensive and angry, reflecting on Mary's comment would have allowed you 
to see that Mary was hurt, confused, and needed your reassurance that 
you are a fair coach. Even if you disagreed with her comment, a moment 
of reflection would have allowed room for the importance of her feelings 
to be validated. A reflective response was the only way for you to win 
I. See PATRICIA 1. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 108 (1991). 
2. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 
I, 7-8 (1976); Charles R. Lawrence III, The ld, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). 
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back Mary's trust, assuming that was important to you. Any questions? 
* * * 
Ignoring obvious reasons why this would have been absurd, I realize it 
has taken me close to seven years to uproot my own White liberalism. 
Significantly, the critical years involved living in an intimate 
mother/daughter relationship with a Black child. The parent/child rela-
tionship may be the most profound, intense, inexplicable, unconditional 
love relationship that any two people can share. A natural part of that re-
lationship, particularly with young children, is a mutual need for the other 
person to be happy, safe, and secure. Parents are especially concerned that 
their children thrive, and are acutely _ emotionally vulnerable when their 
children are injured, mistreated, or otherwise unable to thrive. Com-
pounding the problem, children are sensitive to their parents' anxiety and 
frustration as they try to protect their children from harm. In this way, 
children of color suffer double assaults from racism: externally, racism 
prevents them from thriving by holding them back in all of life ' s races; 
internally, they have to cope with the damage racism does to them and to 
their parents. As a Black mother recently said to me, "I remember the 
pain on my mother's face and I'm sure my children see it on mine.m 
White parents of children of color are uniquely situated to contribute 
to the study of the relationship between White people of goodwill and ra-
cism. I am inspired and encouraged by Professor bell hooks' invitation to 
join in this discourse on race. She writes: 
Luckily, there are individual non-black people who have divested 
of their racism in ways that enable them to establish bonds of in-
timacy based on their ability to love blackness without assuming 
the role of cultural tourists. We have yet to have a significant 
body of writing from these individuals that gives expression to 
how they have shifted attitudes and daily vigilantly resist becom-
ing reinvested in white supremacy. 4 
I am writing about my journey from being a person of goodwill to be-
ing a person who understands she needs to repudiate the privileges that 
attach to being White in America. An example of a modest first step to 
accomplishing this goal is supporting affirmative action, a theme of this 
article. 
Professor Peggy Mcintosh defines White privilege as "an invisible 
3. Comment from an audience member at a conference sponsored by the Gainesville 
Commission on the Status of Women on "Violence Against Women," April 30, 1998. 
4. BELL HOOKS, KILLING RAGE: ENDING RACISM 157-58 (1995). 
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package of unearned assets which ... [a White person] can count on 
cashing in each day, but about which [she] was 'meant' to remain oblivi-
ous."5 My journey has enhanced my understanding of the relationship 
between White privilege and its conjoined ideologies of Black domination 
and subordination. Professor Adrienne Davis poignantly describes this 
relationship: 
Domination, subordination, and privilege are like three heads of a 
hydra. Attacking the most visible heads, domination and subordi-
nation, trying bravely to chop them up into little pieces, will not 
kill the third head, privilege. Like a mythic multi-headed hydra, 
which will inevitably grow another head if all heads are not slain, 
discrimination cannot be ended by focusing only on ... subordi-
nation and domination.6 
My new vantage point, as the mother a Black child, provides me with 
a deeper understanding of three aspects of racism: 
1. White Denial: People of goodwill deny that racism continues 
to be a problem. 
2. Black Skepticism: White denial creates and justifies Black 
skepticism about Whites' commitment to equality. 
3. Racial Anger: White denial and Black skepticism feed a cycle 
of anger and this is poignantly illustrated in the controversy over 
affirmative action. 
Perhaps parts of my journey will "ring true" for other White people of 
goodwill and, in exposing them to deeper aspects of racism, they will bet-
ter appreciate how their views on race may be inadequate to achieve racial 
equality. In turn, perhaps some of them will also be moved to repudiate 
the privileges associated with being White and will be motivated to share 
space7 with Blacks and all people of color in equal ways. 
In undertaking this difficult task, I offer three important caveats. First, 
I accept that complete racial equality cannot be achieved in America as it 
exists today. Yet I also believe that a higher level of racial equality can be 
5. Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in 
PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 7, 17 (Stephanie M. 
Wildman ed., 1996) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter PRIVILEGE REVEALED]. 
6. /d. at 19-20 (footnote omitted). 
7. There is actually a science of"space geography" (the study of the social construction of space) 
and scientists have conducted studies that reveal that involuntarily "segregated space correlates to 
Jack of power and knowledge on the part of the excluded group." Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege 
in the Workplace: The Missing Element in Antidiscrimination Law, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra 
note 5, at 27 (citation omitted). 
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achieved if (at least some) Whites repudiate their White privilege and ac-
tively support equal citizenship for Blacks. By this, I mean that Blacks 
and all people of color have the right to participate in American life with 
equal dignity enjoyed by Whites. To achieve this goal, Whites who are 
people of goodwill must take proactive steps to equalize the racial imbal-
ance in America. Repudiating White privilege is a necessary precursor to 
a complete dismantling of White Supremacy.8 Initially, it may seem im-
plausible that even some Whites would voluntarily repudiate privilege. A-; 
one young Black student pressed me at a conference, "But how realistic is 
it for anyone to voluntarily walk away from power?" My response, per-
haps inadequate and overly optimistic, focused on appealing to an essen-
tial aspect of humanity-its goodwill toward others.9 
Understandably, this suggestion seems full of folly. After all, Dr. 
Alvin Poussaint suggests in his foreword to W.E.B. Du Bois' book The 
Souls of Black Folk that DuBois was naive to suppose that he could rea-
son with Whites and appeal to their goodwill to end Black subordination. 10 
Specifically, Dr. Poussaint wrote: 
There is constantly the temptation to indulge himself to some ex-
tent in the thought that perhaps the problem has never been pre-
sented to the white man in a way that he could truly understand, 
that perhaps this time he could find a way, a language, a medium 
for transmitting the urgency of black America to the white man-
for surely the progress of civilization has proven that reason can 
sometimes prevail, illumine, create; and certainly, the alternatives 
of continuing anguish, hatred, and ultimate suicidal warfare are 
unbearable! 11 
Certainly, I cannot accomplish what Du Bois and other scholars have 
been unable to accomplish. At times, the frustration is enough to craze 
anyone who loves someone of color or who cares deeply about equality. 
As the mother of a Black child, I must make this effort for my daughter 
and for all children. However foolish this project seems, my hope and 
8. See Noellgnatiev, Treason to Whiteness Is Loyalty to Humanity, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: 
LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 607, 608 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) ("So-called 
whites have special responsibilities to abolition that only they can fulfill . Only they can dissolve the 
white race from within, by rejecting the poisoned bait of white-skin privileges."). 
9. See id. at 610 (referring to the WWII slogan "An injury to one is an injury to all" as a 
motivator for repudiating white privilege). See also Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: 
The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) 
(exploring the need to develop strategies for the common good of all people in the struggle for racial 
equality). 
10. See Alvin F. Poussaint, M.D., introduction toW. E. BURGHARDT DuBOIS, THE SOULS OF 
BLACK FOLK xxviii, xxxi (New Am. Library 1969) (1903). 
II . /d. at xxxiii. 
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faith are abiding. 12 
Importantly, most people of goodwill do not want to become co-
conspirators with people, White or Black, who have internalized the as-
sumption that America can never repudiate its racism. 13 Professor bell 
hooks admonishes Black people: "Like our white allies in struggle we 
must consistently keep the faith, by always sharing the truth that white 
people can be anti-racist, that racism is not some immutable character 
flaw." 14 Goodwill Whites who accept racism as immutable may think this 
absolves them of responsibility for helping to end it. 15 In reality, this per-
spective strips them of their agency,16 and, therefore, their power to help 
end racial inequality. A person of goodwill would be inclined to repudiate 
White privilege because she understands her privilege was wrongfully 
obtained through the subordination of Blacks. Thus, an appeal to goodwill 
Whites' commitment to equality can and should be constantly tapped in 
the struggle. 
My second caveat concerns the fact that my comments throughout this 
paper focus primarily on Whites' construction of racism against Blacks. 
By choosing this focus, I do not mean to devalue other critical theories 
about race17 and offer this discussion as part of an ongoing dialogue in-
volving "rotating centers."18 My focus on "White over Black"19 race rela-
12. When Anthony Cook was my colleague at Florida, I used to attend his church and listen to his 
sermons about the role of law in developing goodwill toward others. My daughter was only one year 
old and Anthony, his family, and his congregation helped me begin my journey of love across the 
color line. He is now teaching at Georgetown University and his lessons come to me largely through 
his writings, but with equal inspiration. See, e.g., ANTHONY E. COOK, THE LEAST OF THESE (1996); 
Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism: Resurrecting the Value 
of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEO. L.J. 1431 (1994). 
13. See HOOKS, supra note 4, at 269. 
14. /d. at 269-70. 
15. See id. at271. 
16. For an excellent analysis of the dynamic of agency in sex discrimination, see Kathryn Abrams, 
Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 304 (1995). 
See also, Katherine M. Franke, What 's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691 
( 1997) (exploring agency concept in same-sex harassment cases). 
17. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science " of 
American Radical Thought, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1213, 10 LA RAzA L.J. 127 (1997) (suggesting that the 
focus on Black/White race issues marginalizes other racial groups); Berta Esperanza Hemandez-
Truyol , Borders (En)gendered: Normativites, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
882 (1997) (exploring the need to include Latinas and Latinos in critical race theory); Berta Esperanza 
Hemandez-Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and Latinos At The Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and 
Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 369 (1994) (same). But see Anthony Paul Farley, The 
Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REv. 457 (1997) (arguing that "White on Black" racism is 
central to inequality). 
18. Professor Frank Valdes suggests the concept of "rotating centers" allows one to focus on one 
type of oppression at a time without diminishing the importance of focusing on other types of 
oppression and learning how different types of oppression work together. See Frank Valdes, Remarks 
at the Confronting Race Conference, University of Florida Center for the Study of Race and Race 
Relations (February 20-21 , 1998) (videotape available at the University of Florida College of Law 
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tions stems from my personal experiences with my daughter whose color 
is brown and whose biological mother is White and biological father is 
African American. As Professor Dorothy Roberts explores in her book 
Killing the Black Body, the darker one's skin color, the less valuable one is 
perceived to be in America.20 My personal experiences with my daughter 
support this observation. When the agency set the adoption fee for my 
daughter, it offered to cut the fee in half because she is biracial, she ap-
pears Black, and would have been harder to place than a White baby. Per-
sonal experiences such as this lead to my focus in this article. 
As I share some of the lessons I have learned about racism from loving 
my daughter, my final caveat is equally important. As a person of good-
will, I try hard not to be racist. Recently, a Black colleague publicly ac-
cused me of being racist. I was mortified by the accusation, which was 
leveled at me in front of a large crowd attending a conference on race. 
Although I understand that I am racist because I am part of the institution 
of White privilege, my colleague's image of ine as a "blatant" racist was 
out of keeping with my self-image. The embarrassment and hurt I felt 
overwhelmed my intellectual sensibilities. Unlike the coach, I did not 
aggressively defend myself, but my reaction was just as ineffective; emo-
tionally I shut down, and consequently, did not hear much of what my 
colleague said thereafter. My silent defensiveness caused me to miss an 
opportunity to learn from my colleague. 
Finding an appropriate tone for this article is difficult because I try to 
move those of us who identify ourselves as goodwill Whites into thinking 
about ways we can repudiate White privilege without also feeling defen-
sive about being White. Defensive Whites may be inclined to "drop out" 
of the struggle for racial equality. Simultaneously, as much as I want to 
believe I would never act like the coach, I am also reminded by my col-
league's comment that I may be more like him than I realize or want to be. 
Goodwill Whites are on constant alert as we try to overcome our own ra-
cism but realize we are vulnerable to accusations, often justifiable, that we 
sometimes get it wrong. I accept Professors Stephanie Wildman' s and 
Media Center). Professors Trina Grillo and Stephanie Wildman use a similar concept of"recognition 
time," which they explain: "Recognition time acknowledges both the need to honor the pain of those 
oppressed by other isms, each in their tum, and the need to allow the oppression being focused on to 
remain center stage." Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The 
Implication of Making Comparisons between Racism and Sexism (or Other Isms), in PRJVILEGE 
REVEALED, supra note 5, at 99. 
19. See generally WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968) (discussing the historical 
attitudes of Americans toward Blacks}. 
20. See DoROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997). See also D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, 
and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L.J . 437, 471-78 (1993) (role of color in defining race). 
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Adrienne Davis' advice to worry less about "how to avoid that label [rac-
ist] ... [and] worry[] [more] about systemic racism and how to change 
it. "21 In speaking of "goodwill Whites" in the third person, I try to create a 
safe distance among the images many of us have of ourselves, the images 
others might have of us, and the images we aspire to as we move toward 
repudiating our White privilege so that more racial equality can exist than 
currently does throughout society. 
Thus, learning particularities22 about different racial, ethnic, and other 
identities better enable us to form coalitions and develop overarching 
strategies for ending subordination in the myriad forms it takes-from 
White Supremacy to patriarchy and beyond. In turn, our efforts to appre-
ciate racial equality and repudiate privilege will promote equal citizenship 
for all people. 
II. THE LIMITS OF GOODWILL 
A. How Goodwill Facilitates Whites' Denial of Racism 
As Professor bell hooks writes: 
When liberal whites fail to understand how they can and/or do 
embody ·white supremacist values and beliefs even though they 
may not embrace racism as prejudice or domination (especially 
domination that involves coercive control), they cannot recognize 
the ways their actions support and affirm the very structure of 
racist domination and oppression that they profess to wish to see 
eradicated.23 
As a mother of a Black child, at times I am situated in a different po-
sition from my compatriots of goodwill. I often move from the spotlight 
we share as White liberals and feel isolated from them as I live in the 
shadow of racism. My new vantage point causes me to question the limits 
of White liberalism, a plea many Black and some White scholars have 
been making for a long time.24 Until my relationship with my daughter, 
however, I did not fully appreciate what they were asking me and other 
White liberals to do. My commitment to racial equality as evidenced by 
21. Wildman & Davis, supra note 5, at II. 
22. See Perea, supra note 17, at 1237, 1256. 
23 . HOOKS, supra note 4, at 185. , • 
24. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. 
SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-cLASS EXPERIENCE (1994); HOOKS, supra note 4 ; 
DAVID K. SHIPLER, A COUNTRY OF STRANGERS: BLACKS AND WHITES IN AMERICA (1997); STEPHEN 
STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND 
POLICY (1995). 
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my goodwill seemed to be the best I could offer. 
My motherly experiences bring a reality to the scholars' intellectual 
teachings. Ironically, to understand this, I had to let go of my goodwill 
persona and accept that I play a part in subordinating Blacks. My good-
will toward Blacks was not good enough to dislodge my White liberalist's 
views of the struggle for racial equality. Indeed, a difficult lesson I have 
learned from living with my daughter is that a major, perhaps the greatest, 
barrier to the achievement of racial equality is White liberals' comfort in 
being people of goodwill. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said of "moder-
ate" Whites in his famous letter from a Birmingham jail: 
I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Ne-
gro's great stumbling block in the stride toward freedom is not the 
White Citizens Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white 
moderate who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who pre-
fers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive 
peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says "I 
agree with you in the goal you seek, but I can't agree with your 
methods of direct action;" ... who lives by the myth of time and 
who constantly .advises the Negro to wait until "a more convenient 
season."25 
Being a person of goodwill is comfortable because it does not require 
much more than declaring oneself a non-racist and supporting the theory 
of racial equality. 
Significantly, the community of goodwill includes just about every-
one. Except for avowed racists and White Supremacists, almost every 
White person wants to be thought of as a person of goodwill because most 
White people of goodwill cannot imagine that any of them would act in a 
racist manner. By definition, people of goodwill are not racist, at least not 
intentionally, although occasionally their unconscious racism surfaces. 
For example, the president of the University of Florida, a White man with 
a solid reputation for racial equality, recently made a racist comment about 
a newly appointed Chancellor of the Board of Regents, an African Ameri-
can.26 The President publicly apologized for his comment and the Chan-
25 . Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail, in I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND 
SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 91 (James Melvin Washington ed., Harper San Francisco 
1992) (1986). See also STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 134 (discussing the motivation behind King's 
Letter from a Birmingham Jail) . 
26. See Michelle Jacobs, Closing Remarks at the Confronting Race Conference, University of 
Florida Center for the Study of Race and Race Relations (February 20-21 , 1998) (videotape available 
at the University of Florida College of Law Media Center). 
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cellor and Board of Regents allowed him to remain President.27 
Unconscious racism that never bubbles to the surface plays an espe-
cially significant part in trapping people of goodwill in the limits of their 
own liberalism. As Professors Joe Feagin and Melvin Sikes point out, 
racism is understood by most White people to be an attitude of prejudice 
toward Blacks.28 In contrast, Blacks define racism more inclusively; it is a 
system of institutional preferences for Whites, resulting from historically 
ingrained prejudices Whites have against Blacks. White society's general 
attitude toward Blacks is reflected in the institutional oppression of Blacks 
beginning with slavery and continuing today in ways explored in this pa-
per. Over the last 300-400 years, the subordination has become reified and 
an elementary lesson children learn is to accept Black subordination and 
White privilege as "natural."29 
This observation usually takes goodwill Whites aback, although it 
should not be surprising. The viewpoint that Whites are "superior" to 
Blacks is akin to the viewpoint that boys are "superior" to girls. While 
people of goodwill openly reject both viewpoints, they nevertheless have 
become well-settled in young children's (and some adults') minds despite 
the efforts of liberal Whites and liberal parents. Still, while liberal parents 
seem more able to accept the existence of the false viewpoint of male su-
periority/female inferiority and openly attest to doing the best they can to 
fight it, liberal Whites are much more suspicious of the continuing exis-
tence of the false viewpoint of White superiority/Black inferiority and are 
afraid to confront it. 
This observation may help explain why people of goodwill are disin-
clined to attribute racial connotations to ordinary, everyday negative inter-
actions involving Whites and people of color as long as the Whites are 
people of goodwill (people who do not think they have prejudiced atti-
tudes).30 A specific example arose recently at my law school. In one 
27. See U-F/a. Leader Keeps Job After Apology For Racial Remark, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1998, 
at A6. See also John Lombardi, To: Students, Faculty, Staff. Alumni and Friends, INDEP. FLA. 
ALLIGATOR, Jan. 20, 1998, at I. 
28. See FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 24, at 3. 
29. See HOOKS, supra note 4, at 114-15 (critiquing representation of Black characters in media: 
" [Black] subordination is made to appear 'natural' because most black characters are consistently 
portrayed ·as always a little less ethical and moral than whites, not given to rational reasonable 
action."). See also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, I 06 HARV. L. REv. 1709, 1757 (1993) . 
(discussing the evolution of whiteness from a racial identity to a form of property). See generally A. 
LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996) (discussin~ the historical relationship between race and the 
American legal process from the 17111 Century to the 20th Century). 
30. Most White Americans think that discrimination is no longer significant in America. See 
FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 24, at II . However, studies show that a majority of Whites consider race 
in making important decisions such as "choosing neighborhoods, employees, business partners, places 
to go in the city, and mates for themselves and their children." /d. at 23 . 
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class, as a Black woman contributed to the classroom discussion, one of 
her White classmates started jingling his keys. The Black student inter-
preted the White student's behavior as racist (and sexist); this was the only 
time anyone had jingled keys in the classroom.31 Another White student 
thought the Black student's perception was outrageous and he quickly and 
publicly disavowed that the jingling was racist.32 Rather, he insisted the 
jingled keys indicated that her comments were wasting time.33 The inci-
dent became newsworthy around the law school and within days, the 
White student apologized to the class for his insensitivity, which he as-
sured everyone had nothing to do with race. Some students expressed 
concern that his apology was· half-hearted and superficial, which also 
made its way around the law school and students talked more and more 
about both incidents. The student eventually wrote a more serious apology 
and published it in the student newspaper.34 
As events unfolded at school, some White students talked with me and 
expressed their disbelief that the incident had focused on race because they 
knew the White student who had jingled the keys and they voluntarily 
vouched for his racial goodwill. They simply could not imagine any con-
nection between the White student's disrespectful behavior and their 
classmate ' s race. Similarly, although I connected the coach's behavior 
with my daughter's Blackness, I was uncomfortable sharing this with eve-
ryone around us because I understood that the White parents' goodwill 
was unlikely to allow them to entertain the connection. In the key jingling 
incident, many White students responded by insisting the comment was 
unrelated to race, as the coach responded by angrily denying he treated my 
daughter unfairly and inviting us to quit the team. The Whites involved in 
the different situations reacted similarly to restore goodwill comfort con-
sistent with White denial. 
At least three significant concerns arise from these observations, al-
though I return to my experience with the coach because it involved me. 
First, recall how ludicrous it would have been for me to deconstruct the 
situation for the coach and parents; that would have been too intense and 
31 . See Christine Leon, UF Launches Race Relations Center with Symposium, INDEP. FLA. 
ALLIGATOR, Feb. 23, 1998, at I. The Honorable Susan H. Black, Circuit Judge, United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, who earned her J.D. from the University of Florida College of 
Law in 1967, has commented publicly (and with a smile) about the customary jingling of keys and 
shuffling of feet by male classmates when women spoke in law school classrooms. Judge Black's 
comments were made at a reception honoring the University of Florida's Women of Distinction at the 
College of Law in the Fall , 1997. 
32. See Kevin Eckhardt, Opinions: Key-Jingling Meant to Silence Irrelevance, INDEP. FLA. 
ALLIGATOR, Feb. 24, 1998, at 7. 
33. See id. 
34. See Paul Mascia, Opinions: Perception Is Our Problem, INDEP. FLA. ALLIGATOR, Feb. 27, 
1998, at 7. 
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somewhat silly because critical race theory cannot be explained in a few 
minutes. On the other hand, a mere suggestion by me that race was rele-
vant to the incident also would have been too intense because the discom-
fort level was already too high. The most important concern for the coach 
and parents was to maintain the spirit of goodwill, which acted as a barrier 
to any discussions about race, particularly racism. The coach and parents 
reacted as though my daughter's Blackness was irrelevant to any interac-
tions between her and other members of the softball community. Conse-
quently, I could not have said anything to the softball community that af-
ternoon that would have been helpful to promote racial equality. If any-
thing, I was supposed to say something to restore everyone (but my 
daughter and myself) to a level of comfort. Goodwill can be an effective 
silencer. 
Second, goodwill comfort is important to maintain, causing many 
Whites to shy away from any discussions about race. Even positive daily, 
interracial interactions generally receive no open acknowledgment or dis-
cussion. For example, my daughter's Blackness made the softball team 
diverse, a value many Whites support. Yet the many hours I spent in the 
bleachers with other parents never resulted in one conversation about our 
racial differences. It is hard to imagine that no one was curious about her 
Blackness and my Whiteness. Admittedly, I could have raised the topic, 
but my experiences have taught me that people are more open to such dis-
cussions when they initiate them, and some people do. Increasingly, how-
ever, many Whites get stuck in the race paradox: How can race be valu-
able and yet also irrelevant? How can they talk about race in positive 
ways and avoid talking about racism? This leads to my third concern. 
People of goodwill have felt this cognitive dissonance since the 1960s 
when both color consciousness and color-blindness were the ambiguous 
orders of the day. Specifically, former President Lyndon Johnson, a per-
son of goodwill, issued executive orders to implement affirmative action 
in federal contracting.35 He did this partly in response to the growing un-
rest among Blacks and other people of color in the early 1960s. Arguably, 
implementation of affirmative action programs was a minimal response to 
the vast problem of racism/6 but it nevertheless promoted more racial 
equality than before.37 It also had symbolic significance because it sent a 
message that even the President of the United States supported racial 
equality and would strive to achieve it . 
.. 
35. See Exec. Order No. 11 ,246, 3 C.F.R. 301 (1964-65), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,086, 
41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.10--60-2.15 (1978-1979). 
36. See STEINBERG, :supra note 24, at 166-67 ("[A]ffirmative action was never a desideratum 
pursued for its own sake, but rather a policy of last resort . . . . "). 
37. See id. at 167-68. 
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Shortly after the executive orders, however, President Johnson deliv-
ered a speech at Howard University that implicitly called for race-
neutrality in White society's thinking about racial inequality. Professor 
Stephen Steinberg suggests an examination of part of President Johnson's 
speech: 
[E]qual opportunity is essential, but not enough. Men and women 
of all races are born with the same range of abilities. But ability is 
not just the product of birth. Ability is stretched or stunted by the 
family you live with, and the neighborhoods you live in, by the 
school you go to and the poverty or the richness of your sur-
roundings. It is the product of a hundred unseen forces playing 
upon the infant, the child, and the man.38 
As Professor Steinberg observes, "[t]he conceptual groundwork was being 
laid for a drastic policy reversal: The focus would no longer be on white 
racism, but rather on the deficiencies of Blacks themselves."39 In this way, 
individual circumstances became the focus of Black success, obviating a 
need to notice or value color differences between Blacks and Whites. 
The cognitive dissonance people of goodwill feel continues to move 
them toward color-blindness because they need to resolve the race paradox 
to restore goodwill comfort. This is increasingly more apparent in the last 
few years as many White liberals join with conservatives to explicitly 
abolish affirmative action. If people of goodwill can be convinced that 
adopting the color-blindness philosophy is in individual Blacks' self-
interest, then they are likely to support abolishing affirmative action be-
cause they believe in racial equality. 
Thus, color-blindness is seemingly a perfect solution to the paradox. 
It is only imperfect because it is premised on one big myth: The existence 
of racial equality. White society posits that racial equality is extant 
throughout America.40 Moreover, a focus on formal racial equality pro-
38. /d. at 114 (quoting President Johnson 's speech "To Fulfill These Rights," addressed to the 
Howard University graduating class on June 4, 1965). Professor Steinberg compares Johnson 's 
speech, written by Richard Goodwin and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, with the following passage from a 
1956 book: 
Overt job discrimination is only one of the important hurdles which must be overcome be-
fore color can disappear as a determining factor in the lives and fortunes of men .. . . The 
prevailing view among social scientists holds that there are no significant differences 
among groups as to the distribution of innate aptitudes or at most very slight differences. 
On the other hand, differences among individuals are very substantial. The extent to which 
an individual is able to develop his aptitudes will largely depend upon the circumstances 
present in the family within which he grows up and the opportunities which he encounters 
at school and in the larger community. · 
ELI GINZBERG, THE NEGRO POTENTIAL 7 (1956). 
39. STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 115. 
40. See FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 24, at 319. 
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vides Whites and their supporters with evidence of racial equality. For 
example, they quickly point out that Blacks and other people of color have 
enjoyed opportunities and attained increasing levels of success denied to 
them prior to the Fourteenth Amendment and during Jim Crow. In this 
way, not only is White society beyond the unspeakable atrocities of slav-
ery and the open condoning of race discrimination by the government as 
illustrated by de jure segregation, but White society has also enacted many 
laws to protect people of color from race discrimination. Anti-
discrimination laws such as the Fourteenth Amendment,41 the Civil Rights 
Act,42 and § 1983,43 to list a few, are invoked by White society as concrete 
evidence that it is not racist and that racial equality is a reality. As Profes-
sor john a. powell posits, many Whites believe that racism went out with 
the government's abandonment of explicitly racist laws.44 
Further, Whites who suggest racial equality has been achieved point to 
specific instances where Blacks have been successful at attaining powerful 
positions. They suggest White society is beyond racism because the fol-
lowing events, among others, would not have occurred in a racist society: 
The late Thurgood Marshall and now Clarence Thomas would not have 
been appointed to the United States Supreme Court; the military would not 
have been racially integrated; Colin Powell would not have been Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; graduate schools, medical schools, law 
schools, and other public schools would not have increased their enroll-
ments of people of color. In a racist society, none of these phenomena 
would have happened. A few illustrations of Whites' efforts to promote 
racial equality, coupled with an example or two of instances where indi-
vidual Blacks have excelled, are taken as absolute evidence that racial 
equality has been achieved.45 
Given this need for people of goodwill to believe that racial equality 
has been achieved because this makes them comfortable, it also becomes 
easier to understand the influential forces of"semantic infiltration."46 This 
is a rhetorical device used by politicians, scholars, and other people that 
involves "the appropriation of the language of one' s political opponents 
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I. 
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-3 (1964). 
43 . 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1994). 
44. See john a. powell, An Agenda for The Post-Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 889, 903-04 
(1995) (discounting the colorblind doctrine which suggests that, because the government' s explicitly 
sponsored racism is largely a thing of the past, so must racism be a thing of the past). 
45. Perhaps it may be obvious (certainty" it is obvious at least from the perspective of a person of 
color) that in a non-racist society, absence of persons of color in these positions would not have lasted 
for so long. But see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW ( 1997). 
46. See STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 116. 
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for the purpose of blurring distinctions and molding it to one's own politi-
cal position."47 As long as racial equality has been achieved, then people 
of goodwill will be sensitive to cries of "reverse discrimination" because 
they do not like to be unfair to anyone. Even the United States Supreme 
Court has sanctioned the use of this term.48 
By sleight of hand, many White people of goodwill conflate the appar-
ent absence of intentional racism in their goodwill communities, which 
they helped eliminate as civil rights advocates, with the existence of racial 
equality in American society. The general disappearance of intentional 
racism in their goodwill communities was replaced simultaneously by 
racial equality in their minds. Moreover, the focus on individual successes 
by Blacks obviates any need for White people of goodwill to confront their 
support for institutional racism, the systematic subordination of Blacks 
throughout society, which I discuss below. Concurrently, many White 
people of goodwill metamorphisized from active civil rights advocates 
who thought they did a lot of good, to passive people of goodwill who 
think they do no harm. They deny that this transformation from racism to 
equality did not happen because it is at odds with their goodwill comfort. 
Moreover, the idea that racial equality has been achieved is necessary to 
goodwill people because this is the very ideal that gives them their iden-
tity. 
In everyday life, the color-blind philosophy functions as follows in 
goodwill communities. When a company hires a Black chief executive 
officer, many people of goodwill are unlikely to see this as a step toward 
racial equality and a cause for celebration for two possible reasons. On the 
one hand, some Whites posit that the candidate was hired only because he 
was the most qualified candidate; his race was irrelevant in the selection 
process because racial equality is already here and the competition was 
color-blind. On the other hand, if the company had an affirmative action 
policy, many more Whites increasingly posit that the candidate was hired 
only because he was Black, which was unfair to White candidates because 
racial equality is already here and the competition should have been 
color-blind. Conversely, when the company passes over the Black candi-
date and hires another White chief executive officer, people of goodwill do 
47. !d. Semantic infiltration is one part of the general "backlash" phenomenon common in most 
struggles for equality. The "backlash" occurs when the dominant group demands that "center stage" 
be restored to them because the subordinated groups are receiving too much attention and 
accommodation in their struggle. In the context of race, Professors Grillo & Wildman state, "White 
supremacy creates in whites the expectation that issues of concern to them will be central in every 
discourse." Grillo and Wildman, supra note 18, at 90. For an analysis of the same concept in sex, see 
SUSAN FALVO!, BACKLASH (1991). 
48. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,413 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
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not have to attribute the choice to racism and have cause for concern be-
cause racial equality is already possible and the competition was color-
blind. The White candidate was hired only because he was the most quali-
fied candidate; his race was irrelevant in the selection process. Whites 
who support this view are particularly persuaded of it if the White candi-
date was hired despite the company's affirmative action policy and its 
deviation from a color-blind philosophy. 
Thus, color-blindness seems to offer a way out of the race paradox that 
perplexes people of goodwill. Specifically, they are most comfortable not 
talking about race and succeed in avoiding such discussions so long as the 
world operates under their view of color-blindness. Correspondingly, 
they are less reluctant to talk about race in instances where they believe 
the color-blind principle is violated, as they think it is in affirmative ac-
tion. Whites of goodwill do not feel any dissonance between their support 
for racial equality and their opposition to affirmative action because, from 
their view, racial equality has become the norm and affirmative action 
jeopardizes it. 
B. How White Denial Promotes Black Skepticism 
As most of White society relaxes in the easy chair of denial, most of 
Black society is increasingly agitated about the persistent inequality. Jus-
tifiably, Blacks are skeptical about White society's commitment to racial 
equality and as White denial sets in, Black skepticism grows. Consider 
life in America from Blacks' viewpoint. As a factual matter, a focus on 
formal racial equality reveals that inequality continues to be the norm. 
The American Dream is held out as a promise of equal opportunity for 
success and economic prosperity for all members of society. Most people 
of color understand the promise is largely an empty one, as visions of their 
success and economic prosperity fade into the distance along with White 
society's memories of slavery and, more recently, Jim Craw's institutional 
segregation. 
For example, White Americans average approximately twice the in-
come of Black Americans and are over two times more likely to live in a 
family with an income exceeding $50,000.49 Moreover, Black Americans 
are unemployed at over double the rate of White Americans and are nearly 
three times more likely to live in poverty.5° Current sociological studies 
49. See Robert L. Hayman & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 627, 
678. The economic disparities reflect something beyond a recurring and exceptional set of 
coincidences. See Francis D. Blau & Marfanne A. Ferber, Discrimination: Empirical Evidence from 
the United States, AM. ECON. REv., May 1987, at 319 (1987) (surveying empirical studies and finding 
that "even when fairly refined measures of productivity-related characteristics are held constant, 
blacks and women earn less than whites and men."). 
50. See Hayman & Levitt, supra note 49, at 678-79. 
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report that "95% or more of top positions in major economic, political, 
[and] educational organizations are held by White men."s1 Since Brown v. 
Board of Education'ss2 promise that the government would ensure that 
children of color receive public school educational opportunities equal to 
those available to White children,S3 not only do many public schools re-
main largely involuntarily racially segregated,S4 but the economic dispari-
ties between public schools populated predominantly by White children 
compared to those populated predominantly by children of color remain 
extremely large.ss Our post-Jim Crow society remains largely divided 
along color lines where Whites and Blacks live separately and unequally.s6 
Thus, juxtaposed against the promise of inclusion and equal opportunities 
for everyone is the reality of exclusion and denied opportunities for most 
Blacks and other people of color. 
More progressive thinkers posit that the struggle for racial equality in 
the context of formal equality is misguidedly narrow. Not only is the 
promise of formal racial equality an empty one, but it has done little, if 
anything, to dislodge Western imagination--colored and White-from a 
racist political agenda that is premised on White supremacy, the heart of 
institutional racism.s7 The concept of institutional racism often needs 
clarification and the definition offered by Stokely Carmichael (former 
chairman of the SNCC) and Charles Hamilton (a professor of political 
science) in their book Black Power, is informative. The following passage 
distinguishes between individual and institutional racism: 
Racism is both overt and covert. It takes two, closely related 
forms: individual whites acting against individual blacks, and acts 
51. JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 
(forthcoming 2000). 
52. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
53 . See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Hearl of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. 
REV. LAW & SOC. CHANGE I, 2-7 (1997). 
54. See, e.g., GARY 0RFIELD ET AL., DEEPENING SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
(1997). 
55. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1991) (examining the disparities 
between wealthy and poor public school districts). The Supreme Court held in Missouri v. Jenkins, 
495 U.S. 33 (1990), that a school district did not have to continue to fund quality public education 
programs in an attempt to improve standardized test scores of students in a predominantly Black 
school. For an analysis of Missouri v. Jenkins, see Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the 
De Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REV. 597 (1996). See 
generally Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Charting A New Course, I 06 YALE 
L.J. 2375, 2381 (1997) (exploring how charter schools "offer a viable option for the effective 
education of black children" in light of integration's failure) . 
56. See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 
(1992). 
57. See HOOKS, supra note 4, passim. See generally Kenneth B. Nunn, Law As A Eurocenlric 
Enterprise, 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 323 (1997). 
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by the total white community against the black community. We 
call these individual racism and institutionalized racism. The first 
consists of overt acts by individuals, which cause death, injury or 
the violent destruction of property. This type can be recorded by 
television cameras; it can frequently be observed in the process of 
commission. The second type is less overt, far more subtle, less 
identifiable in terms of specific individuals committing the acts. 
But it is no less destructive of human life. The second type origi-
nates in the operation of established and respected forces in the 
society, and thus receives far less public condemnation than the 
first type. 58 
The authors continue and provide a concrete example of the different 
kinds of racism: 
When a black family moves into a home in a white neighborhood 
and is stoned, burned or routed out, they are victims of an overt act 
of individual racism which many people will condemn-at least in 
words. But it is institutional racism that keeps black people 
locked in dilapidated slum tenements, subject to the daily prey of 
exploitative slumlords, merchants, loan sharks and discriminatory 
real estate agents. The society either pretends it does not know of 
this latter situation, or is in fact incapable of doing anything 
meaningful about it.59 
Naturally, the radical voices of oppositional thinkers who focus their 
concerns primarily on institutional racism are even less likely to be heard 
by White society or by their moderate "formal equality" allies of color. 
Thus, in addition to disagreeing on the question whether formal racial 
equality has been achieved, most goodwill Whites also disagree on the 
question of whether institutional racism exists. 
In Shades of Freedom, Professor Leon Higginbotham explores the 
precepts of White superiority and Black inferiority as the underpinnings 
for institutional racism.60 These precepts function to prevent any kind of 
racial equality, formal or informal. By definition, the precepts posit that 
Blacks are less talented and capable than are Whites as a matter of biol-
ogy, a theory popularized by Dr. Samuel George Morton in the nineteenth 
century.61 Although largely discredited by the 1930s, this theory occasion-
58. STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 75 (quoting STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V . HAMILTON, 
BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 4 (1967)). 
59. /d. at 76. 
60. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 29. 
61. See STEINBERG, supra note 24, at 29 (citing SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON, CRANIA AMERICANA 
(1839)). 
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ally rears its ugly head. For example, in 1995, Richard Hermstein and 
Charles Murray wrote The Bell Curve, a book that promotes White supe-
rior intelligence compared to other races, including Blacks.62 
Professor Steinberg offers an explanation for this theory's resurgence 
only a few years ago. Specifically, he suggests that a focus on native in-
telligence is yet another way of shifting discussions about institutional 
racism back to individuals. Just as the debate about racial equality in the 
1960s shifted from institutional barriers in housing, jobs, and education to 
individual Black poverty, the current debate has shifted from the same 
institutional barriers to individual Black merit. 
A dramatic indication of the vitality of the precepts of White superior-
ity and Black inferiority is seen in the anti-affirmative action movement. 
At the time affirmative action policies were implemented in the 1960s, any 
person of color or White woman who was hired by a public employer or 
admitted to a public university probably was a beneficiary of affirmative 
action: but for affirmative action, the Black person or the White woman 
would not have been hired or admitted. White society's enduring attach-
ment to Jim Crow segregation and its concomitant resistance to integration 
indicated that without the nudge from the government, public employers 
and universities would not have taken steps to desegregate their environ-
ments on the basis of race or sex. 
Unfortunately, the initial purpose of affirmative action, to promote 
Blacks' equal citizenship, has become lost. Again, through the use of se-
mantic-infiltration, anti-affirmative action activists successfully changed 
the focus of affirmative action so that some people think it is synonymous 
with "lowering standards." Shifting the discourse from equality to merit 
suggests the two are mutually exclusive and plays off the view held by 
many Whites in the inherent inferiority of Blacks. The rhetoric of this 
"new racism" merely disguises the message.63 
Consequently, racial minorities who are hired by public employers or 
admitted into public universities as affirmative action beneficiaries are 
stigmatized by the negative connotation given to affirmative action. 
Rather than viewing their addition to public work forces and school pro-
grams as positive steps toward eliminating institutional racism, consistent 
with the struggle for racial equality, their presence in public programs as 
beneficiaries of affirmative action seems to be viewed as a negative step 
backward in America's struggle for national excellence. Couching the 
62. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND 
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERJCAN LIFE (1995). 
63. See Paul Finkelman, The Rise of the New Racism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 245, 246, 281 
(1996) (critiquing DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRJNCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 
(1995), as a "big lie."). 
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objection to affirmative action in the language of "lowering standards" is 
not as overtly racist as the language used by Chief Justice Taney in Dred 
Scott v. Sanford,64 but the derogatory message conveyed by the precepts of 
White superiority and Black inferiority in both contexts is clear. 
Naturally, goodwill Whites resist discussions about institutional ra-
cism. Even if they were willing to acknowledge it, they would vehemently 
object to a characterization of their anti-affirmative action position as 
promoting institutional racism because it is at odds with their goodwill 
identity (self-proclaimed non-prejudiced) and also violates their spirit of 
goodwill because it makes them uncomfortable. In their minds, affirma-
tive action can be abolished, not because they (consciously) think it jeop-
ardizes the quality of America's public employment sector and schools, 
but rather because they believe in color-blindness; the best candidate 
should win and does win and race has nothing to do with it. As long as 
sophisticated discussions about institutional racism fall on deaf White 
ears, Black skepticism makes sense. 
Finally, Black skepticism is justified because White society does not 
seem to be trying to understand racism. Not only is this evidenced by the 
prevalence of White denial throughout society, but it is also premised on 
the reality that Whites can never know the full effects of racism. Regard-
Jess of a White person's empathic skills,65 the person's Whiteness alone 
largely insulates him or her from racism's harm. Many Whites may think 
this limitation excuses them from putting their best effort into the struggle. 
Moreover, glimmers of hope for ending racism fade quickly if ra-
cism's demise depends on Whites' abilities to empathize with victims of 
racism to a degree where they are moved to repudiate their White privi-
lege. Justifiably, Blacks wonder why any White person would voluntarily 
repudiate privilege. After all, if Whites were inclined to be so 
"altruistic,"66 what are they waiting for? I explore this in detail in Part IV 
and briefly mention here that repudiating privilege is not altruism but 
rather is premised on correcting a wrong: the privileges associated with 
64. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
65. See generally Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987) 
(arguing that empathy is an important component of proper legal decision making); Cynthia V. Ward, 
A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism: Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Literature, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 930 (1995) (positing that empathy cannot validly support the contentions of feminist and 
communitarian theorists). 
66. I do not think that repudiating privilege is motivated by altruism, which implies that only 
kindness is behind the act. This would make Blacks' equality with Whites dependent on Whites' 
kindness. Rather, repudiation is built on fhe idea of rejecting the underlying premise of a transaction. 
A person of goodwill would be inclined to repudiate White privilege because she is a person of 
goodwill toward others and she understands her privilege was wrongfully obtained through the 
heinous subordination of Blacks. Her repudiation is not a gift to Blacks; her repudiation is an act of 
harmonizing her self-identity with her goodwill toward others. 
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Whiteness were borne out of the enslavement and dehumanization of 
Blacks. Today's Whites may not be directly responsible for the "sins of 
their fathers," but neither should they be able to benefit directly from their 
inheritance of their fathers' White privilege at the continued expense of 
Black equality. Rather, the act of repudiating White privilege is a neces-
sary step toward equality. Still, Black skepticism warns that the notion 
that a White person would repudiate his or her White privilege seems too 
good to be true. 
Thus, it is reasonable for Blacks to be skeptical of the sincerity of 
Whites who profess to support racial equality. In fact, the barriers of 
White denial, semantic-infiltration tactics, and the anti-affirmative action 
movement lead to an ultimate skepticism reflected in the view held by 
many Blacks and other people of color that racism is here to stay.67 Stated 
alternatively, the continued and persistent de facto involuntary segregation 
as evidenced both by the disproportionate exclusion of people of color in 
sharing the American Dream and by the perpetuation of "nondiscrimina-
tory" racial subordination operate to oppress people of color in ways 
similar to historical institutions like Jim Crow. 
This is a difficult lesson for goodwill Whites who would have to ex-
pend immense amounts of time and effort to learn it. Unfortunately, many 
of them seem unmotivated to study racism, largely because they are in 
denial, but also because the dominant discourse on race in America rein-
forces their need to believe that everything is okay. Moreover, their need 
to believe that racism is history occasionally gets reinforced by prominent 
scholars. For example, Dinesh D'Souza, a scholar of color no less, re-
cently published his book The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial 
Society, in which he argues that racism never was a problem in America. 68 
In their book America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible, the 
authors Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom do not deny America's racist 
history, but throughout their book they do deny that current inequality has 
much, if anything, to do with racism.69 
Goodwill Whites need to be jolted out of this stupor on race-dumped 
out of the easy chairs of White denial that provide so much comfort. Even 
with a jolt, of course, grasping the profoundness of racism on an intellec-
tual level may be inadequate to move some Whites beyond liberalism and 
into the realm of acknowledging the need to repudiate White privilege and 
67. See Derrick Bell, Racism is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 How. L.J. 79 (1991). 
68. See DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY 
(1995). An excellent critique by Paul Finkelman, The Rise of the New Racism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y 
REv. 245 (1996), summarizes a 700 pagejoumey through the arguments supporting White denial. 
69. STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE 
NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997). 
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create shared racial space. For example, I wonder if I would have been 
moved beyond my own White liberalism if I had not become the mother of 
a little Black girl and fallen in love with her. This thought leads to inter-
esting observations. First, intimate love only occasionally crosses racial 
lines. For example, in terms of formal relationships, 1992 data report just 
over one million interracial marriages, of which 246,000 were 
Black/White couples.70 With respect to children in interracial families, 
1991 data reveals that approximately 128,000 children were born to inter-
racial couples71 and that almost two million children have parents of dif-
ferent races.72 This data does not reveal how many Whites were involved 
in the interracial families, which might consist of all people of color with 
different races. Nevertheless, the statistics show that a relatively small 
part of the population enters into formal interracial relationships. Racism 
is here to stay if White people of goodwill are going to move from their 
comfortable positions only if they fall in love with a person of color. 
Interestingly, Alexis de Tocqueville suggests in Democracy in Amer-
ica that racial equality between Blacks and Whites can only be achieved 
by becoming one race of mulattoes: "the mulattoes are the true means of 
transition between the white and the negro; so that wherever mulattoes 
abound, the intermixture of the two races is not impossible."73 Although 
de Tocqueville's observation for achieving racial equality is not necessar-
ily premised on love, it is premised on Whites and Blacks developing in-
timate, even sexual, relationships. Historically, America's legal system 
was structured to criminalize such relationships (except when the White 
Master "raped" the Black Slave), precisely to avoid annihilation of White-
ness. Indeed, much of the historical segregation imposed on Blacks was 
designed to protect the genetic and social purity of the White race by out-
lawing the mixing of Black with White blood.74 This is the rationale for 
the "drop of Black blood" caste system throughout America.75 
70. See Arlene F. Saluter, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1992, in U.S. DEP'T. 
OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS X (Dec. 1992) (the 
number of interracial marriages was reported as I, 161 ,000). 
71. See Jane Gross, UC Berkeley at Crux of New Multiracial Consciousness, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 
1996, at A I , available in LEXIS, News Library, Lat File. 
72. See Linda Mathews, More Than Identity Rides on New Racial Category, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
1996, at AI. 
73. I ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 367 (Henry Reeve trans., Arlington 
House 1966) (1835). 
74. See Cheryl!. Harris, supra note 29 (explaining how the phenomenon of historical segregation 
relates to property laws). • 
75 . Christine B. Hickman, The D;vil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African 
Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1161 , 1163 (1997) (arguing that the "drop of 
Black blood" rule has become a source of Black power). Hickman also notes that "[t]he Devil 
fashioned [the one drop rule] out of racism, malice, greed, lust, and ignorance, but in so doing he also 
accomplished good: His rule created the African-American race as we know it today." /d. at 1166. 
1999] WHY RACIAL GOODWJL[-ISN'T ENOUGH 27 
One of the most disturbing stereotypes of a Black man is that of the 
rapist of the White woman. 76 The 1931 Alabama trial of the Scottsboro 
defendants illustrates the brutal ways White society responded to accusa-
tions of rape by White women against Black men.77 In Scottsboro, nine 
young Black teenagers were convicted of raping two young White women 
on nothing but the women's testimony. As punishment, eight defendants 
received death penalties.78 Through a series of appellate court reversals, 
new trials, more reversals, and more new trials, all of the defendants 
eventually were set free. Unfortunately, the young men spent an aggregate 
of "more than 100 years in jail for a crime they almost surely did not 
commit.m9 The Scottsboro defendants, of course, were not alone in being 
the target of White society's rage at the prospect of Black men raping 
White women. As Edward Lazarus reports in his book Closed Chambers, 
"of the roughly 450 Americans executed for rape between 1930 and 1960 
almost 90 percent were black."80 
In reality, most rape is intra-racial. ''Seventy percent of black rape 
victims were raped by blacks, and 78 percent of white rape victims were 
raped by whites."81 Moreover, the persistence of the myth of the Black 
rapist has masked the reality and ugliness of the White Master raping his 
Black women slaves, a largely untold story in White American history. 
Significantly, the myth also masks the story ofthe modem Black victim by 
rendering her invisible in discussions about male power and female subor-
dination.82 As Professor Cheryl Harris observes: "The archetypes of the 
slave and the mistress were ideologies of womanhood that functioned not 
simply to describe reality, but to represent social relations in a way that 
legitimized and normalized racial and sexual domination."83 
Moreover, White society also found it unconscionable that a Black 
man and a White woman (or a Black woman and a White man) would 
76. For a critique of the myth of Black men raping White women as the primary rape statistic, see 
Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1983). 
77. Lynching was also a common response. See Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, 
and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM. 31 , 32-39 
(1996). 
78. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 77-81 (1998). See generally DAN T. CARTER, 
SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979); JAMES GooDMAN, STORIES OF 
SCOTTSBORO (1994). 
79. LAZARUS, supra note 78, at 81. 
80. /d. at 89. He also notes that Blacks made up only 12% of the population. See id. 
81. Irene Sege, Race, Violence Make Complex Picture, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3 I, 1990, 
National/Foreign Sec., at I . 
82. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 139,158-60. 
83 . Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner 's Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, I 8 
CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 3 I3 (I996). 
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have a voluntary intimate sexual relationship. For example, antimiscegi-
nation statutes that imposed criminal sanctions on Blacks and Whites who 
married each other were not held unconstitutional until the late 1960s, 
only 30 years ago.84 The idea of interracial marriage continues to arouse 
negative sentiments of almost 15% ofWhite Americans who favor making 
interracial marriage illegal.85 Many Blacks also oppose marriage with 
Whites, viewing such unions as a threat to Black unity.86 Naturally, falling 
in love with a person of color does not mean a White person will under-
stand racism or be motivated to help end it.87 
The parent/child relationship involves a different kind of love from 
that of romantic partners, but it also is characterized by a power 
imbalance88 that is magnified when the parent is White and the child is 
Black because of historical and persistent racial subordination of Blacks 
by Whites. The concern that interracial love is inadequate to overcome 
racism largely shapes the debate about interracial adoptions. Many Blacks 
oppose adoption by White parents of Black children because they see such 
adoptions as inevitable "cultural genocide."89 That is, most Blacks under-
stand the limits of White liberalism; no matter how goodwilled the pro-
spective White parents are, they are not fully able to appreciate the signifi-
cance of being Black in America.90 
84. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 2 (1967) (holding that the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from imposing statutory schemes 
prohibiting miscegenation). 
85 . See Hickman, supra note 75, at 1164 n.10 ("[A] 1994 poll showed that 14.7% of White 
Americans still favor a law making interracial marriage illegal" citing Up From Separatism, THE 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1995, at 30). See generally Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing With 
Loving?: Race, Law, and Intermarriage, 77 B.U. L. REv. 815 (1997) (exploring impediments to 
Black/White marriages, although supportive of them). 
86. See SH!PLER, supra note 24, at 115-16 ("Not all objection to interracial dating comes from 
whites. In the spirit of black pride, black solidarity, black cultural cohesion, some blacks also resist 
and resent."). 
87. In an analogous context, heterosexual love has not dismantled patriarchy. In fact, many 
feminist scholars posit that heterosexual "love" maintains patriarchy. As Professor Catherine 
MacKinnon admonishes: "Heterosexuality is [patriarchy's] social structure, desire its internal 
dynamic, gender and family its congealed forms, sex roles its qualities generalized to social persona, 
reproduction a consequence, and control its issue." CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A 
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 3-4 (1989). Similarly, Professor bell hooks writes that "[p]atriarchy 
is about domination." HOOKS, supra note 4, at 73. 
88. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 843 (1989). 
89. The National Association of Black Social Workers took the position in 1972 that "Black . 
children should be placed only with Black families" primarily in its belief that this policy was in the 
child' s best interest and that it also protected black cultural identity. See RITA JAMES SIMON & 
HOWARD ALTSTE!N, TRANSRAC!AL ADOPTION 9 (1977) (quoting from the National Ass 'n of Black 
Soc. Workers, Position Paper (1972)). 
90. See Jacqueline Macaulay & Stewart Macaulay, Adoption for Black Children: A Case Study of 
Expert Discretion, 1 REs. L. & Soc. 265, 280-305 (1978) (exploring the arguments against adoption 
of Black children by White parents). But see Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? 
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Thus, arguments against transracial Black/White adoptions rest on an 
assumption that it would not be in the Black child's best interest to be 
raised by White parents who have a limited understanding of racism and 
who cannot teach the child to value his or her racial and cultural identity.91 
Moreover, White parents who believe in color-blindness and knowingly 
teach their Black children to assimilate into White culture jeopardize the 
existence of the Black community by altogether undermining the impor-
tance of race and culture to the child's identity. 92 This is not in B Jack soci-
ety's best interest, either. 
Supporters of transracial adoptions posit that policies that prevent in-
terracial adoptions also are problematic and discriminatory.93 People who 
take this view argue that it is better for a Black child to be placed in a 
permanent home with White parents than it is for the child to be moved 
from foster home to foster home awaiting adoptive Black parents.94 Sig-
nificantly, there are many more Black children available for adoption than 
there are Black adults willing to adopt them.95 Finally, supporters of trans-
racial adoptions also emphasize that studies consistently report that Black 
children raised in White families fare as well as adopted children raised by 
same-race parents.96 
As an adoptive White mother of a Black child, I am caught in the mid-
dle of the national discourse on interracial adoptions by White parents of 
Black children. As a mother, though, the debate is moot for me: my 
daughter and I are a family and to separate us now would do inexplicable 
damage to both of us. Ironically, the state allowed us to become a family 
because we were both "imperfect" in its eyes. I was "imperfect" because I 
was unmarried; she was "imperfect" because she is mulatto. Our devia-
The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1163 (1991) (arguing that the best 
interests of Black adoptees are often served through transracial adoption). 
91. See Macaulay & Macaulay, supra note 90. See generally Twila L. Perry, The Transracial 
Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 33 (1993) (discussing the role of colorblind individualism in the transracial adoption debate). 
92. The assimilation problem has been articulated most poignantly in the context of school 
integration and the failure of Brown. See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Black People in White 
Face: Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665 (1995); Charles R. 
P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequality, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 363 (1998). 
93. See generally ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
PARENTING (1993) (arguing for a more positive construction of adoption and the need for a nurturing 
home); R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents ' Racial Preferences 
Through Discriminatory State Action, I 07 YALE L.J. 875 (1998) (exploring how racial preferences in 
adoption impact contemporary racial inequality). 
94. See Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1223-26 (arguing that delay in placement can cause 
psychological trauma). 
95 . See BARTHOLET, supra note 93, at 96. 
96. See Bartholet, supra note 90, at 1211-16, 1221-25. 
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tions from patriarchal and White supremacist values brought us together. 
As a scholar, however, the debate continues to intrigue me, although 
my motherly experiences influence my theoretical analysis. My increased 
knowledge about racism informs my theoretical position on interracial 
adoptions in one limited and narrow way: my daughter would benefit from 
having a Black parent in her life. Coincidentally, she seemed destined to 
have a White mother, which would have been the case if her biological 
mother had decided to raise her. Her foster parents and their children also 
were White. From my dual mother/scholar perspective, I think both sides 
in the adoption debate have meritorious arguments. Professor Twila 
Perry' s suggestion that a Black child raised by White parents does suffer 
some loss comports with my growing awareness of racism.97 Specifically, 
and I am speaking only for my family situation based on what I have 
learned, I think my daughter suffers from the loss of racial connectedness 
between herself and a Black parent. A Black parent would be able to un-
derstand her pain of racism in ways that I still cannot articulate. Perhaps 
this deeper connectedness would empower my daughter in ways I cannot. 
There is no empirical way to measure the loss a Black child suffers 
from being raised by White rather than Black parents. Nor is there any 
empirical way to evaluate whether the quicker permanent White home 
placement choice outweighs the waiting for Black parents choice. Given 
this uncertainty, recent federal legislation governing transracial adoptions 
struck a balance by outlawing mandatory same-race adoptions, but allow-
ing agencies to deny placement of Black children with "racially or cultur-
ally insensitive" White parents.98 
Thus, although I have always espoused positive color consciousness 
because I have always "seen" race and think racial differences are valu-
able, my development from being a person of goodwill to being an advo-
cate for repudiating White privilege and actively abandoning White racism 
has taken years and is an on-going process. My life consists of almost 
daily lessons on racism and race relations. My experiences have taught 
me a valuable lesson: in addition to reading about racism on an academic 
level, one must also take deliberate steps to learn about practical, day-to-
97. See Perry, supra note 91 , at 57-59 (criticizing studies suggesting Black children suffer no 
harm from being raised by White parents). 
98. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, § 1808 
(a)(3) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)) reads: 
[N]either the State nor any other ,s:ntity in the State that receives funds from the Federal 
Government and is involved in adoption or foster care placements may-
( A) deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent, on the ba-
sis of race, color, or national origin of the person, or of the child, involved; or 
(B) delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the basis of 
the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved. 
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day effects of racism and White society's denial of equal citizenship to . 
Blacks. Even if people of goodwill do the former, my guess is they do not 
do the latter. 
Racism is intellectually and practically difficult to fathom for most 
Whites. White denial absorbs most thinking about race among Whites 
who increasingly posit that racism is history. Some Whites think formal 
equality has been achieved; many reject the nondiscriminatory racial sub-
ordination theory; and yet a third group of self-proclaimed White Su-
premacists do not believe in racial equality at all. An intellectual grasp of 
racism may be insufficient to enable most White liberals to understand 
that repudiating their unearned racial privilege is necessary to end Black 
subordination and achieve racial equality. Simultaneously, Black skepti-
cism grows as most people of color believe racial equality remains elusive 
either because formal equality has failed or because of the more systemic 
problem of institutional racism that results in their persistent racial oppres-
sion. Not surprisingly, this talking at cross-purposes has resulted in an 
angry racial divide on fundamental questions of racial equality. 
C. How White Denial and Black Skepticism Feed a Cycle of Racial Anger 
Racial anger is worth studying because it is an emotion that directly 
jeopardizes White society's comfort zone and concomitantly manifests 
deep frustration among Blacks at White denial that racial subordination 
persists. My experience is that the potential for anger seems to lie just 
beneath the surface of almost every interracial interaction or any discus-
sion about race, particularly if the interaction or discussion takes place 
with a pre-existing underlying tension. Being aware of and sensitive to 
racial differences minimizes the possibility that any negative racial feel-
ings (even unconscious ones) will exacerbate existing angry ones.99 
For example, the footrace incident evoked many feelings, but certainly 
anger was a driving force behind the exchange. My daughter was mad at 
the coach, he was mad at her, I was mad at him, and he quickly got mad at 
me. Moreover, my daughter's Blackness and the coach's and my White-
ness were relevant in evaluating our behavior toward each other. Consider 
the incident from my daughter's and my perspectives. When a Black per-
son is mistreated by a White person, the Black person knows the mis-
treatment was race-related even if the White person did not act intention-
ally racist. 
Perhaps my daughter was too young to articulate the racial dynamics 
involved in the footrace incident, although she has articulated on occasion 
99. Obviously, this is true in all interracial interactions, even those in which the perpetrator is 
Black and the victim is White. Healthy race relations are a two-way street. 
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how she feels devalued by Whites because she is Black. Like most 
Blacks, my daughter constantly is aware of her Blackness and was sensi-
tive to being the only Black child on the team. As her mother, I also am 
constantly aware of her Blackness. How could she not wonder if her 
Blackness turned the coach against her? I wondered. 
Now try to imagine the incident from the coach's perspective or the 
perspective of any White person of goodwill. It is reasonable to conclude 
that the White person was aware of Mary's Blackness during the angry 
exchange. This is a realistic conclusion because White people of goodwill 
consciously try not to be racist, a goal that generally requires maximum 
effort in an angry exchange with a Black person. How could the coach not 
wonder if we (or at least I and perhaps the other White adults) were 
thinking he was racist? And if he did wonder about this, it probably would 
have caused him to be angrier or more defensive than he would have been 
with a simple accusation of unfairness that could more easily have been 
seen as a misunderstanding. 
Thus, from both perspectives, race was at the forefront of the angry 
exchange. Although none of us ever mentioned it, I knew the exchange 
had an element of racial anger in it. I suspect the coach knew it as well on 
some level of consciousness even if he was not fully aware of it. 
The footrace incident is a small example of racial anger, but never-
theless is significant. As Mary's mother, I am concerned that my daughter 
will build up resentment toward White society at the injustice she endures. 
Like most types of anger, racial anger does not appear suddenly but rather 
festers over time. In a larger context, Professor bell hooks writes that 
much of the current rage felt by African Americans and other people of 
color about the absence of racial equality in society centers around White 
society's denial that ours is a White supremacist society.10° Continuing, 
she admonishes: "The danger of that denial cannot be understood, nor the 
rage it evokes, as long as the public refuses to acknowledge that this is a 
white supremacist culture and that white supremacy is rooted in pathologi-
cal responses to difference.'' 101 The reality of pervasive racism against 
Blacks throughout society, including seemingly small incidents, supports 
Blacks' accusations that unfair treatment is race-related. 
Understandably, any human being who is persistently subordinated 
and oppressed is likely to object and protest, and justifiably feel angry or 
enraged. Legal theory understands this individual human tendency as evi-
denced by the concept of ''justifiable homicide.'' For example, some 
criminal defendants charged with murder have been able to avoid convic-
100. See HOOKS, supra note 4, at 27. 
101. !d. 
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tion on showing that their murderous anger was justified by some action-
persistent physical abuse, violence, threats of harm-directed at them by 
their victims.102 In 1968, psychiatrists William H. Grier and Price M. 
Cobbs identified a mental condition they called "black rage,"103 which has 
been offered by criminal defense lawyers in American courtrooms to ex-
cuse their client's criminal conduct. 104 The defense is premised on psychi-
atric findings that the constant racial stress Blacks endure can cause them 
to act out their uncontrollable rage by committing criminal acts. 105 
Whether or not one finds merit in the defense of "black rage," its mere 
existence is sociologically noteworthy. If nothing else, reflecting on it 
focuses attention on the profound and justifiable frustration White denial 
causes Blacks. The defense posits that Blacks' pleas to end racism, when 
met with persistent denial or indifference, can be a highly effective psy-
chological tool to drive Blacks figuratively or literally mad.106 
In a different context, a relationship between White denial and Blacks' 
mental health may seem more plausible. White denial can operate as a 
form (mild or harsh) of emotional abuse with respect to its use with chil-
dren. Elsewhere, I have written on the psychological harm White denial 
causes children of color. 107 The law plays an especially important role in 
protecting children from abusive adults, including emotionally abusive 
adults. For example, child abuse legally has been defined broadly to in-
clude inflicting "mental injury."108 Even if White society is unwilling to 
acknowledge the psychological toll racism takes on Black adults, perhaps 
it can better understand how racism, in its myriad forms, chips away at the 
self-esteem of children of color. There can be no doubt that racism, espe-
cially the precepts of Black inferiority and White superiority, is psycho-
logically unhealthy for all children. 
Moreover, when oppressors ignore victims' protests or otherwise re-
102. See, e.g., Judd F. Sneirson, Black Rage and the Criminal Law: A Principled Approach to a 
Polarized Debate, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2251 , 2260-62 (1995) (surveying the justification and excuse 
defenses in criminal law); see generally PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 2-7 
(1997) (describing the Black rage defense and its role in the legal history of the past century); Patricia 
J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based Upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment: 
Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REv. 731 , 748-57 (1996) 
(discussing how Black rage is affected by precipitating events and racial overtones). 
103. See WILLIAM H. GRIER& PRICEM. COBBS, BLACK RAGE (1968). 
I 04. See Sneirson, supra note I 02, at 2252. 
105. See id. 
106. See id. The contrary view is presented by Professor Alan Dershowitz who posits that "the 
' black rage ' variation on the abuse-excuse defense is an insult to millions of law-abiding black 
Americans." ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-QUTS, SOB STORIES AND 
EVASIONS OF REsPONSIBILITY 90 ( 1994). 
107. This is the primary motivation for writing my book, LOVING ACROSS THE COLOR LINE: A 
WHITE ADOPTIVE MOTHER LEARNS ABOUT RACE (forthcoming 2000). 
108. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 827.03 (1997). 
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spond .with indifference to victims' cries of pain, naturally the victims' 
rage and frustration are exacerbated. Individuals who share concerns 
about subordination may come together and violently protest. Indeed, 
White America was established out of rage at English laws that denied 
colonists freedom of religion, speech, autonomy, and liberty. Their need 
to live a life of dignity resulted in the Revolutionary War. The Boston Tea 
Party, a relatively modest but violent protest, reflected the colonists' out-
rage at oppressive taxes. Many historical wars and physical engagements 
exemplify this point. As victims of mistreatment by oppressive govern-
ments, White society has often responded with rage, rebellion, and revolu-
tion. 
Colored rage is to be expected in a society that privileges Whiteness 
over other racial colors. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "To give a man his 
freedom and to leave him in wretchedness and ignominy is nothing less 
than to prepare a future chief for a revolt of the slaves."109 Indeed, Amer-
ica has witnessed several significant riots by Blacks and other people of 
color in response to racial oppression. The Watts riots in the 1960s illus-
trate the profound rage Blacks felt about their subordination. Professors 
Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders describe the scene: 
In Watts the violence raged unchecked for three days, and three 
days longer in sporadic eruptions. Blacks looted stores, set fires, 
burned cars, and shot at policemen and firemen. Before the vio-
lence was halted, 14,000 National Guard troops, 1,000 police offi-
cers, and more than 700 sheriff's deputies were pressed into serv-
ice. More than 46 square miles-an area larger than Manhattan-
came under military control. In the end, 1,000 buildings were 
damaged burned, looted, or completely destroyed; almost 4,000 
people were arrested; more than 1,000 were injured seriously 
enough to require medical treatment; and 34 were dead, all but 
three black. 110 
Watts was followed by at least 250 more riots in 1967,111 a forceful 
message (similar to the one the colonists sent to England) by Black 
America that it had had enough of White denial, White privilege, and per-
sistent inequality. 
Thirty years later, White America was given another Watts-type mes-
sage in the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the acquittal of the White 
109. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 73, at 373-74. 
II 0. DoNALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND 
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 103 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
Ill. See id. 
1999] WHY RACIAL GOODWILL ISN'T ENOUGH 35 
police officers who brutally beat Rodney King. 112 Professors Joe Feagin 
and Hernan Vera describe the riots as the worst ones this century: more 
than 2,400 people were injured, over 50 died, and property worth billions 
of dollars was damaged.113 Certainly, the Los Angeles riots forcefully 
demonstrate that Blacks, Latinos, Asian-Americans, and all people of 
color continue to be outraged by the unequal treatment they receive in 
America even though the days of slavery and de jure segregation are gone. 
Nor is evidence of Black rage limited to examples of violent outbursts. 
Just as White society resisted Blacks' non-violent boycotts and marches, 
(remember how they were "pummeled with nightsticks and set upon by 
police dogs"114) it continues to be challenged by modern Black non-violent 
protests of racism. For example, Professor Paul Butler suggests as an an-
tidote to the racial inequality in the criminal justice system that jurors 
should refrain from convicting Black criminal defendants who are accused 
of nonviolent, victimless crimes.115 In his opinion, a criminal justice sys-
tem that is so permeated with racial inequality should be dismantled. 116 
Not surprisingly, Professor Butler's pleas for a revolution in the form 
of jury nullification have been opposed, 117 even by other Blacks. A most 
notable critic is Professor Randall Kennedy who suggests that jury nullifi-
cation crosses the line of "respectable" tactics challenging racial subordi-
nation.118 Butler focuses on Kennedy's remarks: 
[F]or a stigmatized racial minority, successful efforts to move up-
ward in society must be accompanied at every step by a keen at-
tentiveness to the morality of means, the reputation of the group, 
and the need to be extra careful in order to avoid the derogatory 
charges lying in wait in a hostile environment. 119 
112. See Deborah Waire Post, Race, Riots and the Rule of Law, 70 DENY. U. L. REv. 237, 250 
(1993). For an excellent critique of the meaning of the riots, see Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the 
Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 965, 968-69 (1995). 
113. See JOE R. FEAGIN & HERNAN VERA, WHITE RACISM 83-84,97 (1995). 
114. KINDER & SANDERS, supra notel10, at 104. See also THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra 
note 69, at 119-20 (describing the Greensboro sit-in on Feb. I, 1960). 
115. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L. J. 677, 679 (1995); see also Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule 
of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1997). 
116. See Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, Ill HARV. 
L. REV. 1270, 1285-86 (1998); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson, Respectability, Race Neutrality, and 
Truth, 107 YALE L.J. 2619 (1998); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the 
Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63 (1993) (both analyzing racial injustice 
throughout the criminal justice system). 
117. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to 
Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. REv. 109 (1996); Richard St. John, License to Nullify: The Democratic 
and Constitutional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, I 06 YALE L.J. 2563 (1997). 
118. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997). 
119. Butler, supra note 116, at 1282 (quoting KENNEDY, supra note 118, at 20). 
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Butler questions why Kennedy is concerned with choosing anti-
subordination strategies that are not upsetting to Whites: "Kennedy's ap-
prehension of how whites would react to widespread black jury nullifica-
tion leads him to urge blacks to chose tactics, that, unlike nullification, do 
not offend the white majority."120 
This exchange between two prominent Black law professors exempli-
fies the powerful interplay between White denial and White privilege. 
Butler justifiably is enraged at the profound and persistent racial subordi-
nation in America and thinks radical tactics are necessary to snap White 
society out of its denial. Jury nullification, although radical and contro-
versial to some people, seems modest in comparison to Watts and Los 
Angeles. Kennedy may be right that this disturbance of White society's 
rules may result in a heightened protection of White privilege. If Kennedy 
is correct, he is justifiably worried about making Whites feel even more 
threatened and uncomfortable about issues of racial equality. Recall that 
the predominant White response to Watts was to turn away from the Civil 
Rights struggle for racial equality. Watts may have signified the begin-
ning of White society's belief that (enough) equality had been achieved. 121 
Certainly, Watts, Los Angeles, and jury nullification illustrate that 
White society is not a good listener to Blacks' cries of foul. White Amer-
ica's reactions to Blacks' pleas for equality resemble more those of the 
British Monarch than they do the freedom-seeking colonists who would 
have appreciated an empathic ear, especially if resolution of their conflicts 
could have avoided a revolution. Rather than responding to the problem 
of increasing anger in colored communities with reflection, compassion, 
and empathy, however, White society uses its privilege to maintain its 
comfort by creating its own protests as a reminder and insistence of its 
view that (enough) race equality has been achieved. A specific example is 
provided by White society's outrage at the Los Angeles riots and what it 
interpreted as a barbaric "eye-for-an-eye" beating of Reginald Denny by 
Black rioters. Professor Juan Perea's analysis is insightful: "Reginald 
Denny's beating created possibilities for certain artificial and misleading 
symmetries: Even if the Los Angeles police were out of control, so were 
the black rioters; a black victim is matched by a paired white victim." 122 
Three years later, a jury of nine African-Americans, two Whites, and 
120. Butler, supra note 116, at 1283. 
121. See KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 110, at 103 ("If the civil rights movement and the 
flagrantly racist reaction it incited compelled many white Americans to express their support for racial 
equality as a matter of principle, the riots and the new belligerent rhetoric pushed them in quite a 
different direction ... . In the view of many white Americans, the problem of race was solved."). 
122. Perea, supra note 112, at 967 (footnote omitted); see Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial 
Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1301, 1303 (1995) (analyzing the rhetoric of race in trials involving 
racial violence). 
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one Hispanic acquitted O.J. Simpson of murdering Nicole Simpson and 
Ron Goldman. 123 To the amazement of most Whites, most Blacks were 
ecstatic. Professor David Shipler offers an explanation: 
Perhaps the rush of joy after the Simpson verdict came from a 
burst of empowerment, a sudden feeling that black people could 
finally penetrate the high walls of the system to make something 
right. That may also have been a source of much of the white dis-
tress-the notion of blacks having power, of blacks wielding their 
authority as unjustly as whites have wielded theirs. Black vio-
lence and black power seem part of the same continuum. 124 
In White society's eyes, O.J. killed Nicole Simpson and Ron Gold-
man.125 The riots and the responses to O.J.'s acquittal dramatically illus-
trate the different ways Whites and Blacks see race in America. 126 
White society did not respond with like-kind violence to the Los An-
geles riots, the Reginald Denny beating, or the O.J. Simpson verdict. In-
terestingly, however, within four years of Los Angeles and within one year 
of O.J.'s acquittal, California passed Proposition 209, making affirmative 
123. See SHIPLER, supra note 24, at 397. 
124. Jd. at 400-01. 
125. See id. at 347 ("After the jury made its decision, a Washington Post poll found that 85 percent 
of blacks and 34 percent of whites agreed with the verdict; 8 percent of blacks and 55 percent of 
whites disagreed."). 
126. Although the acquittal of O.J. Simpson in his trial for allegedly murdering Nicole Brown 
Simpson and Ronald Goldman did not inspire Whites to riot, his acquittal did enrage most White 
Americans who felt he got away with murder. That was disturbing enough to many White Americans, 
but their anger was exacerbated in the O.J. case because most Whites believed Simpson's lawyer, 
Johnnie Cochran, deliberately and inappropriately played "the race card." Specifically, some Whites 
believed that Cochran obscured the question of O.J.'s guilt or innocence by turning the case into a 
conspiracy by the White police officers and detectives against O.J. For most White Americans, the 
idea that the White officers would be involved in a conspiracy against Blacks was preposterous and 
deeply offensive. 
Compounding their sense of outrage at the allegations of a conspiracy within the specific 
context of the Simpson trial was a more generalized feeling by many White Americans that Black 
America attributed the White officers' alleged racist motivations to any White who believed O.J. 
committed the murders. Somehow, the allegations of the officer's conspiracy against O.J. translated 
into an accusation that White America, particularly its criminal justice system, was "out to get" Black 
Americans, especially Black men. The ugliness and absurdity of the allegation that White America is 
racist made many Whites defensive and angry. Any possible relationship between White police 
officer conduct in the O.J. investigation and White police officer conduct in Los Angeles and 
elsewhere toward Blacks, Latinos, and other people of color never got explored in the broader context 
of institutional racism. Rather, the allegations of White police officer racism could simply be 
dismissed as irrational in the context ofO.J.'s case because it was so obvious to White society that he 
was guilty. See generally Devon W Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Victim, 
32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 49 (1997); George Fischer, The O.J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REv. 
971 (1997). 
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action illegal. 127 Whether there is a connection between the events is a 
matter for sociologists and political analysts. My point here is much more 
modest and does not turn on finding a causal connection. In fact, people 
of goodwill would not retaliate, at least not consciously. Assuming that 
Proposition 209 is not retaliatory, then White denial of the problem of 
racial unrest is perfectly illustrated because passage of Proposition 209 
only created more anger and frustration in the Black community as its ac-
cess to California's public universities was sharply curtailed. 128 If Propo-
sition 209 is related (even unconsciously) to growing White discomfort 
with racial unrest, then it is clear that, not only is White society unable or 
unwilling to engage in healthy discourse in response to Black anger, but it 
seems determined to see just how far it can push Blacks' patience to 
maintain Whites' comfort. Concomitantly, when Blacks explode with 
rage (Los Angeles) or offer radical theories of anti-subordination Gury 
nullification), White society feels justified in restoring its position of com-
fort by outlawing policies like affirmative action that promote (some) ra-
cial equality and symbolize America's commitment to equality for Blacks. 
This view of the anti-affirmative action movement is worth exploring; 
perhaps there are ways to break the cycle of racial anger. Affirmative ac-
tion, perhaps more than any other policy on race, keeps society deeply 
entrenched in an angry debate about racial equality. The two are inextri-
cably intertwined. Whites posit: equality is here, affirmative action is ob-
solete. Blacks posit: inequality persists, affirmative action is necessary. 
Most Whites are so uncomfortable talking about race that perhaps they 
think abolishing affirmative action will stop the riots and radical theories 
and restore their comfortable peace. Simultaneously, Blacks fear abolish-
127. Proposition 209 states: "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment 
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." CAL. CONST. art. I , § 31 , 
cl. a. Ward Connerly, a University of California Regent and a Black man, is the leader behind the 
Proposition 209 movement. See Louis Freedberg, UC Law Schools at Wit 's End As Minorities Go 
Elsewhere, S.F. CHRON., July 18, 1997, at AI , available in LEXIS, News Library, Sfchron File. 
Because Proposition 209 is supported by a Black person, some people will be inclined to summarily 
dismiss any possibility that Proposition 209 passed because the recent racial unrest was making 
Whites too uncomfortable. Blacks often disagree on many issues and Ward Connerly is entitled to 
oppose affirmative action, just like Whites are given that option. See Angela Harris, Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 , 585 (1990). However, the fact of his 
Blackness is relevant precisely because many Whites think in essentialist terms. See Leslie Espinoza, 
Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1878, 1883 (1990) 
(taking exception to Professor Randall Kennedy 's position that being Black does not give one a 
"special vantage point," in his article, Racjal Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745, 
1801-03 (1989)). The point, of course, is that Proposition 209 passed because a lot of White voters 
supported it and they may have been influenced by the fact of Ward Connerly 's race. 
128. See Carl Rowan, Scholastic Genocide, DENY. POST, May 24, 1997, at B7, available in LEXIS, 
News Library, Dpost File (enrollment of black and Hispanic students in law and medical schools in 
Texas and California reported to be down 81% and 50%, respectively) . 
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ing affirmative action enhances White denial and allows White society to 
continue to subordinate them. Obviously, eliminating affirmative action 
will augment the racial divide by placing the burden of managing racial 
anger on Blacks who will continue to be denied equal citizenship, an in-
creasingly intolerable situation. As the debate rages on, one of the most 
obvious issues surrounding affirmative action and racial equality is over-
looked: Whites and Blacks have not figured out a way to talk construc-
tively about race. The following section explores these dynamics of af-
firmative action and racial anger. 
III. RECKONING WITH PRIVILEGE: THE CHALLENGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE 
OF GOODWILL 
A. Struggling with the Dissonance Between White Privilege and Black 
Subordination 
I. Public Elementary and High Schools 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 129 the Court held that it was uncon-
stitutional to legally mandate the separation of Black children from White 
children in public education. 130 The Brown decision requiring admittance 
of Black children to White public elementary and high schools functioned 
as an affirmative action order by imposing a duty on states to create public 
space that could be shared by Blacks and Whites. Affirmative action is 
not typically couched this way, but I want to define it this way in this pa-
per. Specifically, the Brown Court understood that affirmative steps had 
to be taken to change the reality of two essential aspects of Jim Crow ra-
cism: the lack of formal equality of Blacks compared to Whites, and the . 
continuation of White society's subordination of Blacks. Affirmative ac-
tion involves taking steps to promote the equal citizenship of Blacks con-
sistent with the democratic principle of racial equality by eliminating pub-
licly reserved White space and creating publicly shared racial space. 
By the time Brown was decided, the Court understood that achieving 
racial equality for Blacks depended on dismantling, not just the economic 
inequality, but also the social inequality perpetuated by White Supremacy 
that wreaked havoc on the souls of Blacks, as W.E.B. Du Bois 
described. 131 A decision to provide equal funding for Black and White 
public schools and otherwise to uphold the constitutionality of the "sepa-
129. See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
130. See id. at 495 . 
131. See W. E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (New Am. Library 1969) 
(1903). 
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rate but equal" doctrine in public education in the 1950s would have left in 
place a social caste system that defined Black space as "space at the bot-
tom," and that concomitantly reserved "space at the top" for Whites only. 
Dismantling White over Black racism is the heart of Brown and equality. 
Brown's mandate to make public elementary and high schools share 
racial space proved to be a daunting task and one that was met with ex-
treme resistance by many states. 132 For example, some schools allowed 
children to opt out of placements in racial minority schools and return to 
their home schools where they belonged to the racial majority, but the 
Supreme Court held this practice unconstitutional in 1963 in Goss v. 
Board of Education. 133 Some schools decided it would be better to shut 
down altogether rather than share space with Blacks, but the Court also 
held this practice unconstitutional one year later in Griffin v. County 
School Board. 134 Finally, in 1968 in Green v. County School Board, 135 the 
Court emphatically stated that a school board has "the affirmative duty to 
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in 
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."136 The 
Green decision held unconstitutional a plan that allowed children to 
choose which school to attend thereby maintaining separate spaces for 
Black and White public school students. 
As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky states, with passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, particularly Title VI which prohibited public schools 
from discriminating on the basis of race if they received federal funds, 
came a certain acquiescence by most states that White-only space had to 
be shared with Blacks. 137 It bears highlighting that White society took 
almost fifteen years after Brown, through a series of Supreme Court cases 
and after passage of the Civil Rights Act, to accept that shared racial space 
132. See James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained 
90 COLUM. L. REv. 1463, 1587-88 (1990). The author notes: 
The [Virginia] General Assembly met in special session and enacted legislation to close 
any public schools where white and colored children were enrolled together, to cut off state 
funds to such schools, to pay tuition grants to children in nonsectarian private schools .... 
In April 1959 ... the Assembly repealed Virginia's compulsory attendance laws and in-
stead made school attendance a matter oflocal option .... 
/d. See also Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1964 
(holding that it was unconstitutional for Prince Edward County, Virginia, to close its schools to avoic 
integration). 
Many other Southern States also closed schools to avoid desegregation. See Davison M 
Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During the Decade After Brown, 8' 
Nw. U. L. REv. 92, 99 (1994) . . 
133 . 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963). ,. .. 
134. 377 u.s. 218, 232 (1964). 
135. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
136. /d. at 437-38. 
137. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 578 (1997). 
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in public schools is constitutionally compelled. Moreover, busing children 
from school to school in an attempt to achieve some level of shared space 
became the common, but controversial, method for achieving some level 
of racial equality. 138 · 
2. Public Work Space 
Recall that around this time, President Lyndon B. Johnson also im-
plemented one of the most important affirmative action policies emanating 
from the Executive Branch, Executive Order 11246,139 which represents 
the more typical understanding of affirmative action. Under the Order, 
government contractors had to abide by two principles: officially, they 
were obligated to stop discriminating against racial minorities, and they 
also were obligated to ensure an adequate representation of minority con-
tractors in the government contracting program. 140 By the late 1960s, the 
Department of Labor had issued regulations pursuant to the Order, estab-
lishing goals and timetables for government contractors to hire 
minorities. 141 
Sociologists and historians have documented how President Johnson ' s 
Executive Order stemmed less from his commitment to racial equality and 
more from his concern with quelling the racial violence at the time. The 
former President is quoted as telling business leaders, "If they're [Blacks] 
working, they won't be throwing bombs in your homes and plants . ... 
Keep them busy and they won't have time to burn your cars." 142 It is un-
fortunate that President Johnson invoked the stereotype of Blacks as natu-
rally violent and criminal as justification to White society for the need to 
implement affirmative action. His comments grossly failed to appreciate 
the validity of Black society's naturally angry and predictable violent re-
sponse to White 'society's heinous mistreatment and exclusion of them 
from empowering spaces in the public sector. President Johnson's atti-
tude, as reflected in his comments, causes critics to question the sincerity 
138. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL 
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 131-216 (1979); Davison M. Douglas, The End of Busing, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 1715 (1997) (reviewing GARY 0RFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET 
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996)). 
139. See Exec. Order No. 11 ,246, 3 C.F.R. 301 (1964-65), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 
538-41 (1994), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,086, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e app. at 543-45 (1994). 
140. See id. See also 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1998)(protecting "minority groups and women"). 
141. See Jean Stefancic, Affirmative Action: Diversity of Opinions-An Overview of the Colorado 
Law Review Symposium, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 833 ( 1997). 
142. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Bookmark; the Day LBJ Looked Industry in the Eye-and Stared 
Them Down, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1991 , at 3, available in, LEXIS, News Library, Lat File. 
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of the entire country's commitment to racial equality}43 
Notwithstanding this significant misstep in the initial implementation 
of affirmative action, at least two positive things can be said about it. 
First, President Johnson's 1965 Executive Order 11246, renewed by Presi-
dent Nixon in 1974, reflected the Executive Branch's evaluation that, as 
the principal enforcer of the law, it needed to take a leadership role in 
overcoming White society's resistance both to racial equality generally, 
and to shared public space specifically. Just as public schools needed to 
be "persuaded" to follow the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, other 
sectors of White society also resisted the demise of Jim Crow and needed 
similar inducements to abandon segregation and share space with Blacks. 
A second valuable message was conveyed by Executive Order 11246. 
Notwithstanding the racism surrounding its implementation, President 
Johnson had it right: violence is the inevitable outcome whenever a group 
of people are persistently subordinated because of their race and their gov-
ernment does virtually nothing to promote the group's right to equality. 
White society should have seen the violence coming, not because the pro-
testors were Black, but because White society subordinated the protestors 
because they were Black. A continuing manifestation of White over Black 
racism was the persistent exclusion of Blacks from participation in public 
spaces where critical legal and social policy decisions were made. Execu-
tive Order 11246 is a small but significant sign that White America can be 
responsive to Blacks' pleas for equality consistent with its goodwill and 
even if its motives reflect (unconscious) racist attitudes. 
Thus, although the typical form of affirmative action was implemented 
to avoid racial violence by making public employers' create space for 
Black workers, Blacks' right to equality as decided by Brown and its prog-
eny could be meaningful only if Blacks were included and allowed to par-
ticipate in the educational and economic vitality of America. Enforcing 
public employers ' constitutional duty to create shared space for workers of 
all races was equivalent to enforcing Brown 's mandate to create shared 
space for public school students of all races. 
Moreover, while enjoining official discrimination was necessary to 
meet Brown 's mandate, it was not sufficient to achieve the goal. Ensuring 
Blacks' presence in public elementary and high schools, as well as public 
employment, required active, affirmative steps because neither environ-
ment willingly and immediately surrendered its Whites-only exclusivity 
privileges. In this way, affirmative action has always been about creating 
•" 
143. See generally Eleanor Marie Brown, Note, The Tower of Babel: Bridging the Divide Between 
Critical Race Theory and "Mainstream " Civil Rights Scholarship, 105 YALE L.J. 513, 518 (1995) 
(addressing the common critiques of critical race theory and racial opinion surveys over the past 40 
years). 
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shared racial space-an essential aspect of racial equality. 
3. Public Colleges and Universities 
43 
As public colleges and universities tried to achieve racial equality in 
their programs, busing made no sense at all and the Executive Order 
11426 governing public employment did not apply. Yet public colleges 
and universities also were subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's equality 
principles. Title VI provided incentives for public colleges and universi-
ties to stop official racial discrimination by threatening to withhold federal 
funding if they continued to maintain all White space through discrimina-
tory practices. 144 Again, Title VI laid the foundation for enjoining dis-
crimination, the necessary first step to dismantling Jim Crow, but standing 
alone, it lacked the impetus that even Brown and Executive Order 11426 
each lacked. Without some affirmative step beyond stopping the discrimi-
nation, Brown, Executive Order 11426, and Title VI would be theoretically 
significant, but practically meaningless. Even in the face of those laws, 
White society tenaciously held onto White space at the expense of Blacks' 
equality. 
Delightfully, University of California at Davis Medical School was a 
public institution founded in 1968 that affirmatively tried to walk away 
from Jim Crow. It was eligible for, and did receive, federal funding under 
Title VI because it did not discriminate officially on the basis of race in its 
admissions policy. 145 But the absence of official race discrimination did 
little, if anything, to ensure a minority presence in the medical school 
classes, largely because of institutional racism. Consequently, Davis im-
plemented an admissions policy in 1969146 that represented for public 
higher education the more typical affirmative action policy similar to what 
Executive Order 11246 represented for government contractors. Specifi-
cally, the school decided to take affirmative steps to ensure the presence of 
racial minority students in its medical school by setting aside 16 of 100 
seats for them.147 Its plan was to create shared racial space where students 
of all races could study medicine together. 
144. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) ("No person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."). 
145. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 412 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("The University also acknowledges that it was, and still is, receiving federal financial assistance."). 
Naturally, U.C. Davis Medical School did unconsciously discriminate against racial minorities while 
receiving federal funds because it was a part of institutional racism. 
146. When it was implemented in 1973, it focused on applicants who considered themselves 
"economically or educationally disadvantaged." Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 553 P.2d 
1152, 1156 (Cal. 1976). 
147. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275. 
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The dearth of minority students in medical schools generally resulted 
from the schools' heavy reliance on the Medical College Aptitude Test 
("MCA T'), which minority students performed poorly on compared to 
most White students. 148 The disparity in scores between Whites and mi-
nority students was a reflection of cultural bias on the exam, particularly at 
that time when segregation continued to be preferred by most of White 
society. Some people, especially Whites, have difficulty imagining what 
cultural bias means in the context of applicants seeking admission to Davis 
based on a standardized exam they all had to take, because this seems fair. 
However, imagine what the exam represented to Black applicants. The 
MCA T, particularly at the time of the Davis plan in the late 1960s, was 
created by educators who had been educated in an all-White, Jim Crow 
society that was legally and socially unavailable to Blacks. Not only were 
Black applicants denied access to that space and to the resources to obtain 
an education equivalent to that available to White applicants, but the 
White educators who prepared and administered the exam also had no 
knowledge of Black culture and history, which was not included on the 
exam. This resulted in a double disadvantage for the Black applicants: 
they were not acquainted with many aspects of White culture tested on the 
exam, and the examiners were not acquainted with any aspects of Black 
culture, which consequently could not be tested on the exam.149 
To compensate for this unfairness in the admissions selection process, 
Davis' policy set aside 16 of 100 seats in its 1973 entering class for self-
identified applicants who were "economically and/or educationally disad-
vantaged."150 In 1974, the school changed the set-aside application form to 
conform to the one prescribed by the American Medical College Applica-
tion Service and allowed students to self-identify based on their race or 
ethnicity, not on their "disadvantage."151 Applicants who were identified 
as disadvantaged in 1973 or as a racial minority in 197 4 were reviewed by 
a separate admissions committee, which looked more closely at factors 
other than MCAT scores and grade point averages to evaluate the appli-
cant's aptitude to study medicine. 152 All applicants admitted under the 
148. See id. at 277 & n.7; see also id. at 377 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1184 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). 
149. See Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1169; see also id. at 1186 (Tobriner, J., dissenting) . Professors Susan 
Sturm and Lani Guinier have gathered the research data and provided a critical analysis of the 
problems with reliance on standardized ~xams in establishing merit in a recent article. See Susan 
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. 
REv . 953 (1996). 
150. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75 . 
151. See Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1156 & n.3. 
152. See id. at 1158-59. 
1999] WHY RACIAL GOODWILL ISN 'T ENOUGH 45 
program from 1969 through 1974 were racial minorities.ISJ In this way, 
U.C. Davis' affirmative action policy was highly successful at achieving 
its primary goal of "promot[ing] diversity."154 Stated alternatively, U.C. 
Davis successfully created shared racial space by annually admitting at 
least 16 economically or educationally disadvantaged students during 
those years. 
U.C. Davis Medical School was like every other public medical school 
that suffered from a noticeable absence or dearth of minority applicants in 
their classes in the early 1970s. After all, it was not until the late 1960s 
that Brown began to be fully (even if involuntarily) appreciated, and it was 
only in 1974 that President Nixon renewed President Johnson's Executive 
Order governing affirmative action in government contracts.m Davis' 
plan seemed in keeping with growing efforts around the country to end the 
remnants of Jim Crow segregation and to take serious, affirmative steps 
toward racial equality. Significantly, the Davis plan was art effort to cre-
ate shared racial space at the Medical School consistent with the growing 
goodwill many Whites felt toward racial minorities or wanted to adopt as 
part of their self-images as non-racists and supporters of racial equality. 
4. Mr. Bakke 's Suit 
In 1973 and 1974, as Davis functioned under its affirmative action 
policy, a White man named Allan Bakke applied to Davis and other medi-
cal schools to become a doctor. 156 He did not self-identify as economically 
disadvantaged or as a racial minority either year. 157 At Davis, Mr. Bakke 
faced keen competition for the 84 "regular" spaces; in 1973, 2,644 persons 
applied and in 1974, 3,737 persons applied. 158 Mr. Bakke, along with 814 
applicants in 1973 and 462 applicants in 1974, qualified for an interview 
with Davis officials based on his MCATs and his undergraduate grade 
point average. 159 Getting the interview, however, did not and could not 
guarantee acceptance because the school only had 100 seats available each 
year. Logically, the interview played a key role in determining who would 
be admitted to the school. 
Mr. Bakke was not admitted to Davis or placed on the waiting list ei-
153. See id. at 1157. 
154. See id. at 1155 (The University 's "purposes of the special program were to promote diversity 
in the student body and the medical profession and to expand medical education opportunities to 
persons from economically or educationally disadvantaged backgrounds."). 
155. See Exec. Order No. II ,246, 3 C.F.R. 301 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 
538-41 (1994), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,086, 3 C.F.R. 230 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e app. at 543-45 ( 1994). 
156. See Bakke, 553 P.2d at 1155. 
157. Seeid. 
158. See id. at 1157. 
159. See id. 
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ther year. 160 Admissions processes are competitive and the evaluations of 
applicants are necessarily relative. The question faced by the admissions 
committee at Davis, then, was not whether Mr. Bakke was academically 
impressive in some absolute way, but rather, the question the committee 
asked was whether he was among the most academically impressive can-
didates in light of multiple factors, including at least his MCA T scores, his 
undergraduate grade point average, and his interviews. If the school had 
relied only on MCA Ts and GPAs to admit applicants, the admissions 
committee may (or may not) have concluded that Mr. Bakke should have 
been admitted. Because the school relied on additional criteria, the com• 
mittee concluded Mr. Bakke was not as academically impressive as the 
admitted candidates. 
Understandably, getting rejected from Davis would upset most people, 
especially most people with a strong academic record like Mr. Bakke's. 
Although, Mr. Bakke's determination to become a doctor was admirable, 
unfortunately, he decided to try to gain admission to Davis by establishing 
the illegality of Davis' set-aside policy in a lawsuit. His suit was premised 
on his exclusion from consideration for the 16 spaces set-aside for disad-
vantaged students in 1973 and racial minorities in 1974,161 a policy he al-
leged promoted "reverse discrimination." 162 Under this theory, he asserted 
that because the government could not discriminate against Blacks based 
on their race, then neither could it discriminate against him based on his 
race. 163 Stated alternatively, Mr. Bakke claimed that the admissions policy 
had to be color-blind to avoid race discrimination, an important value to 
people of goodwill. 164 This perspective has become increasingly more 
popular during the last thirty years among White people of goodwill. 
It is common knowledge that the Supreme Court upheld Mr. Bakke's 
challenge, 165 and it is adequate to briefly review the Court's rationale. 
First, the Court built upon the principle that Mr. Bakke was an "innocent 
160. See id. at 1155. 
161. See id. at 1169. 
162. See id. 
163. See id. at 1155. 
164. For the significance of "color-blind" rhetoric in U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence, see Neil 
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind, " 44 STAN. L. REv. I (1991). 
165. It remains unclear on what basis the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Bakke. In an opinion 
authored by Justice Stevens, four justices, including Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and 
Rehnquist, opined that the admission plan violated Title VI and therefore did not reach the 
constitutional issue. See Bakke, 438 U .~. at 417-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) . However, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concluded that the admission plan 
complied both with Title VI and with the Constitution. See id. at 324-26 (Brennan, White, Marshall 
& Blackmun, J.J ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell, announcing the judgment 
of the Court, interpreted Title VI "to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the 
Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment." /d. at 287. 
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victim" in the struggle to achieve racial equality at Davis. 166 Conse-
quently, the Court held it would be unfair to impose on him the burden of 
helping to racially diversify the medical school by making him ineligible 
to compete for the 16 seats set aside for minority applicants. 167 The Court 
acknowledged that public colleges and universities constitutionally can 
strive to achieve "diversity," but the Court also admonished that diversity 
must be defined more broadly to include characteristics other than race. 168 
For example, the Court opined that it would be constitutional for admis-
sions officials to factor in the attractiveness of an applicant based on his or 
her geographical residence, athletic ability, or musical talent. 169 
Mr. Bakke's lawsuit reflects an attitude held by many White appli-
cants to public universities even today. 170 A controversial example is pro-
vided by Ms. Cheryl Hopwood, a White applicant who was rejected from 
the University of Texas Law School in 1992.171 The basis for her lawsuit 
mirrored that of Bakke's; she had higher scores than those Blacks and 
Mexican-Americans who were admitted under an affirmative action pro-
gram.172 Hopwood is controversial because the Fifth Circuit held, contra to 
Bakke, that it was unconstitutional for the University of Texas to consider 
race in admissions for the purpose of diversifying its class.173 
Operating on the assumption that Mr. Bakke and Ms. Hopwood are 
people of goodwill, a closer look at their lawsuits provides an opportunity 
to understand why goodwill is not enough to achieve racial equality. In-
deed, their cases show how goodwill allows Whites to act in ways that 
seem in keeping with racial equality, but which impose significant if not 
impossible barriers to the creation and existence of shared racial space. 
B. Struggling with the Tension Between White Goodwill and White 
Privilege 
As discussed above, in the 1960s White society began to appreciate 
166. See id. at 298. 
167. Seeid.at319. 
168. Seeid. at315. 
169. See id. at 316-18. 
170. Contrast the Bakke Court's opinion with a more recent case mandating the desegregation of 
public schools, see Sheffv. O'Neill , 238 Conn. I, 678 A.2d 1267 (1995). For an analysis of Sheff, see 
Mary Jane Lee, How Sheff Revives Brown: Reconsidering Desegregation's Role in Creating Equal 
Educational Opportunity, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 485 (1999). 
· 171. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
172. See id. at 936-38. 
173. See id. at 945-46. The court justified its departure from Bakke on this issue by explaining that 
only Justice Powell had upheld the use of diversity in Bakke, see id. at 944, and that in later cases, 
such as Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990), City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1515 U.S. 200, 226-
27 (1995), the Supreme Court failed to support diversity as a compelling rationale to justify 
affirmative action programs. See id. at 944-45. 
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the need to act affirmatively to share racial space with Blacks and other 
people of color. Over the years, White society has not lost its goodwill 
toward Blacks, but it has used its goodwill persona to deny the reality of 
continuing racial inequality as evidenced by the persistent existence of 
predominantly, if not exclusively, White spaces in most public arenas at 
the privileged end of the socio-economic hierarchy. Since the 1960s, the 
minds of many goodwill Whites who consciously support racial equality 
are often the same minds that suffer from White denial and oppose af-
firmative action. Yet Whites who feel this way experience little, if any, 
dissonance because most of them do not appreciate or even fully under-
stand the concept of White privilege. In fact, most White people of good-
will probably would say they enjoy no special privileges under the law; 
they are ordinary people, just like Blacks. 
This view does not fully explain Bakke, which came at a time when 
this country had barely begun the effort to achieve racial equality. In this 
way, it is unbelievable that the Court adopted the theory of "reverse dis-
crimination," which made no sense at the time. Critically, it does not 
make sense even today. Both Mr. Bakke's and Ms. Hopwood's cases 
show how insidiously White privilege operates, which is not always easy 
to see or to explain, and the help of Professor Berta Hernandez-Truyol 
deserves mention. I thank her and proceed with caution. 
Specifically, critical facts in Bakke and Hopwood were not highlighted 
by the plaintiffs or the courts, but when brought out, they expose the (un-
conscious) racism in both decisions. For example, much is made of the 
fact that Mr. Bakke's MCATs and GPA were higher than the racial mi-
norities who were admitted. Indeed, this is the crux of his lawsuit. How-
ever, little is made of the fact that Mr. Bakke's MCAT scores also were 
higher than the scores of many White applicants who were admitted. It is 
hard to discern exactly how many Whites with lower scores were admitted 
over Mr. Bakke, but it is fair to conclude that it was a significant number 
given that Mr. Bakke's Verbal, Quantitative, Science and General Infor-
mation scores on the MCAT were 15, 18, 14 and 3 points higher, respec-
tively, than the average scores for all of the White applicants who were 
admitted in 1973.174 His scores in 1974 were also significantly higher than 
the average scores ofthe admitted Whites. 175 
Similarly, Ms. Hopwood stressed in her suit only that racial minorities 
with lower scores than hers had been admitted. 176 Like Mr. Bakke, she did 
not challenge as unfair or as illegal the admission of White applicants with 
.. 
174. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277 n. 7. 
175. See id. at 278 n.7. The one exception was his score on General Information. His score of72 
was also the average score for the Whites who were admitted. See id. 
176. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551,553 (W.O. Tex 1994). 
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lower scores than hers, of which there were over 100.177 Admittedly, the 
only practical basis for a legal challenge to the affirmative action policies 
at Davis and Texas was race, which may explain why Mr. Bakke and Ms. 
Hopwood did not make much of the facts that White applicants with lower 
scores also were admitted over them. It is worth highlighting, however, 
that both Mr. Bakke's and Ms. Hopwood's arguments against the affirma-
tive action policies were based on how unfair it was for the admissions 
officials to reject them because their scores were higher than the admitted 
racial minorities, without also alleging the unfairness of admitting Whites 
·with lower scores. If scores were the crux of the matter (assuming no bias 
concerns), then unfairness rightfully was the name of the game and Mr. 
Bakke and Ms. Hopwood should have challenged the admission of Whites 
with lower scores as well. If scores were not the crux of the matter, as 
they obviously were not, then (unconscious) racism wrongfully was the 
name of the game and Mr. Bakke and Ms. Hopwood should not have 
challenged the admission of the racial minorities. Regardless of which 
version of the game was played, however, notice how White privilege op-
erated. 
In the unfairness version, White privilege protected Whites with lower 
scores from being challenged by the plaintiffs. The lower scoring Whites 
also were spared the "stigma" of being admitted with lesser qualifications 
compared to the plaintiffs. In short, White privilege insulated the lower 
scoring Whites from ever being perceived as "unqualified" and from any 
questions about their rightful place at the table. 
In contrast, the plaintiffs in the (unconscious) racism version were 
protected by their Whiteness. Specifically, the White plaintiffs with 
higher scores had their rejections nullified solely because some racial mi-
norities, but not numerous Whites, with lower scores were admitted. In 
this version, the admitted racial minorities' qualifications were success-
fully challenged. Their lower scores compared to the plaintiffs were cen-
tral to both courts' conclusions that race had been used to disadvantage the 
plaintiffs. That the courts did not consider the lower scores of Whites who 
were admitted, effectively calls the real question regarding the relevance, 
let alone centrality, of race. 
A failure to understand White privilege makes it easier for White de-
nial to thrive. Because Whites ordinarily fail to understand the privilege 
of Whiteness, they cannot fathom how their anti-affirmative action posi-
tion promotes racial inequality. As White people of goodwill, they are 
self-avowed anti-racists. The Bakke and Hopwood cases highlight how 
177. See Strurm & Guinier, supra note 149, at 962 n.28 (citing to the State of Texas Petition for 
Certiorari, Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)) . 
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White people of goodwill (think they) use the rhetoric of equality to pro-
tect their status as ordinary people who should be able to compete with 
racial minorities, also ordinary people, on equal terms. 
Interestingly, Mr. Bakke was born in 1940 and grew up in Jim Crow 
America. I am unable to find accounts of how he felt about de jure segre-
gation. Like most children his age, though, he was indoctrinated during 
his young life with the most vivid precepts of White superiority and Black 
inferiority, including segregated public spaces for Whites and Blacks. By 
the time he applied to medical school, affirmative action threatened (per-
haps unconsciously) the "natural order" he had grown up to believe in. 
Given what Mr. Bakke and the rest of America had been taught about 
race from society's lessons of slavery and Jim Crow, it is not surprising 
that he, many other Whites, and some of the White Justices, felt White 
applicants to U.C. Davis Medical School were "victimized" by rac~-based 
affirmative action. Mr. Bakke and all of his supporters, presumably peo-
ple of goodwill, did not think of themselves as promoting or condoning 
racial inequality. Consequently, because Mr. Bakke believed he had not 
done anything to cause or support the racial segregation at Davis, he felt it 
would be unfair to force him to participate in remedial efforts to create 
space for racial minorities in the school. 
This perspective promotes a disjunction between affirmative action 
and racial equality, yet both concepts require the existence of shared racial 
space. The disjunction arises because individual and institutional racism 
are not seen as related. 178 Moreover, if the connection was not made by 
Whites of goodwill who witnessed Jim Crow, one should not be surprised 
that the connection probably escapes Whites in Ms. Hopwood's generation 
because that generation believes racism is history and that racial equality 
is already here. Moreover, the general failure to connect individual and 
institutional racism is evidenced by an overly narrow focus on what the 
facts in Bakke and Hopwood show to be a false sense of entitlement that 
then is discussed as individual racism by opponents of affirmative action, 
as though institutional racism were irrelevant in that context. Similarly, a 
narrow focus on institutional racism in the broader context of racial equal-
ity fails to acknowledge how individual White denial promotes institu-
tional racism. 
Recall that in the world of goodwill, the two forms of racism are per-
178. For further discussion on the dltference between diversity and affirmative action, see Arnold 
H. Loewy, Taking Bakke Seriously: Distinguishing Diversity from Affirmative Action in the Law 
School Admissions Process, 77 N.C .. L. REv. 1479 (1999). See also Lino A. Graglia, Professor 
Loewy 's "Diversity " Defense of Racial Preference: Defining Discrimination Away, 77 N.C. L. REv. 
1505 (1999). For a discussion of the difference between diversity and equality, see Sharon Elizabeth 
Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER& L. 43 (1997). 
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manently linked so long as individual racism is manifested in an individ-
ual's unconscious support of institutional racism. Simultaneously, it is 
difficult for goodwill Whites like Mr. Bakke and Ms. Hopwood to com-
prehend how their White privilege promotes institutional racism because 
this is a difficult lesson, as my experiences as a mother highlight. The 
lesson is especially elusive because of the persistent denial by White soci-
ety that any individual White person of goodwill supports racism in any 
form. 
In this way, everyone could concede that Mr. Bakke was not guilty of 
race discrimination at Davis, but it would only be in this context that de-
claring him "innocent," as the Court did, 179 makes any sense. Moreover, 
the Court's holding that he is an innocent victim is doubly problematic. 
First, it implies that someone else, not something else like White society's 
historical institutional support of Black subordination through slavery and 
Jim Crow, is responsible for the exclusion of minorities at Davis. Making 
rejected White applicants the "innocent victims" of affirmative action 
policies concomitantly makes the minority applicants the "guilty perpe-
trators" of an admissions policy Whites, like Ms. Hopwood, call unfair 
today. 
Moreover, the Bakke Court's focus on individuals was anything but 
balanced and equal. For example, the Court's express use of the term "in-
nocent" in relation to Whites and its implied juxtaposition of "guilty" in 
relation to racial minorities is itself racist: it feeds the stereotype of people 
of color, especially Blacks, as criminal. Certainly by returning sixteen 
spaces to the White competition pile, and thereby almost guaranteeing that 
minority applicants would continue to be excluded from Davis so long as 
the MCA T continued to be biased, the minority students were in effect 
"punished" as if they were guilty for Davis officials' efforts to create 
shared racial space. Because the focus in Bakke was always on individual 
White innocence, the connection between individual racism and institu-
tional racism was ignored. Twenty-five years later, this ignorance made it 
that much easier for Ms. Hopwood to dismantle the University of Texas 
Law School's affirmative action policy. 
To summarize, less than fifteen years after White society actively be-
gan to move toward racial equality as evidenced by passage of the Civil 
Rights Act, the gradual creation of shared racial space in public schools, 
and the implementation of affirmative action in the public sector under 
Executive Order 11246, White society's (unconscious) racism was begin-
ning to show. Efforts to remedy institutional racism have become lost in 
White society's insistence that individual racism is no longer a problem, 
179. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (referring to Bakke as an "innocent person"). 
52 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
meaning racism is no longer a problem. White denial and White privilege 
are powerful barriers to racial equality, and both are camouflaged by 
White goodwill. · 
Thus, repealing affirmative action programs sends a message to 
Blacks that they are expected to cope with their continued exclusion from 
many empowering positions in society that historically and currently are 
held by Whites. In other words, anti-affirmative action proponents expect 
Blacks to accept their unequal citizenship status even though racism is 
pervasive. This places the entire burden of managing racial anger on 
Blacks. A person of goodwill who condones placing the entire burden of 
coping with racism on Blacks loses part of her self-identity. Additionally, 
this perspective on how to manage racial anger is a misguided and narrow 
solution to systemic problems at odds with the values of shared racial 
space and equality. Yet these are important values to people of goodwill. 
One way to break the cycle of denial, skepticism, and anger is for Whites 
to acknowledge that they benefit from White privilege, and to refuse to 
take advantage of their privileged access to public spaces and allow for the 
existence of shared racial space. Whites can promote equality by taking 
advantage of opportunities such as those offered by affirmative action to 
create shared racial space. 
IV. BEYOND GOODWILL: REFUSING PRIVILEGE AND SHARING SPACE 
Consider how long it would take for ... a culture to be oblit-
erated if members of the group were seized, carried to another 
place, with no records of its former learning, with its language 
killed, and with its family structure destroyed by separating chil-
dren from parents. How long would it be before all the cultural 
strength of that group, acquired and maintained perhaps for thou-
sands of years, was crushed and replaced by its opposite? Two 
generations, three, four? America still pays for the crimes of slav-
ery. We may never stop paying for them. We never ought to, un-
til the day comes when black children have the same opportunities 
that others have. Affirmative action is no cure-all. It is only a 
small effort to do some good. 180 
A. Generally 
Many Whites think ab<?lishing affirmative action will restore peace 
and peace is attractive in a · racially troubled society. Abolishing affirma-
180. Jeb Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L. J. 427, 471 (1997). 
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tive action, however, comes at a price that America is not yet able to pay. 
For example, California recently outlawed affirmative action and within a 
year, the number of racial minorities in its university system radically 
dropped. Specifically, the University's Class of 2002 admitted 8,000 stu-
dents to Berkeley, including 191 Blacks (down from 562 the previous 
year). 181 Berkeley accepted 852 Hispanic students, down from 1,411 the 
previous year. 182 UCLA accepted 11,000 students: 280 Blacks (down from 
488 the previous year) and 1,001 Hispanics (down from 1,497 the previous 
year).tsJ 
The picture is even bleaker in California's public law schools. Boalt 
Law School accepted 14 Black students (out of 792), an 80% drop from 
the previous year. 184 All fourteen acceptees decided to go elsewhere. 185 
UCLA adopted an "economic disadvantage" approach to admissions after 
Proposition 209, but its Black enrollment also dropped 80%. 186 Michael 
Rappaport, Dean of Admissions at UCLA stated, "The problem is that [the 
new focus on economic disadvantage] did not work well in that we will 
have a class that is not nearly as racially balanced as we had in the past."187 
As critics of such a class based admissions program had predicted "[i]n 
absolute numbers, there are many more economically disadvantaged white 
students than blacks."188 This is consistent with Professor Deborah Mala-
mud's evaluation of substituting economic for race-based affirmative ac-
tion.189 Similar patterns arise in other states that mandate color-blind ad-
missions in public colleges and universities as well. 190 
California officials quickly realized that abolishing affirmative action 
left an unwanted void in their educational environments, as evidenced by 
officials future actions to try to undo the harm. Ironically, now state offi-
cials are seeking ways to overcome the harsh effects of the ban because 
their public educational institutions are suffering from the lack of quality 
the African-American students brought to their environments. 191 Perhaps 
181. See Richard Reeves, Baby Boomers Betray Their Younger Selves, DENY. POST, April 13, 
1998, at Bll, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dpost File. 
182. See id. 
183. ·See id. 
184. See Freedberg, supra note 127. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. 
187. !d. 
188. !d. 
189. See Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL Eouc. 452, 
465 (1997) ("[O]ne must remember that minorities are minorities: there are more white poor people 
than black and Latino poor people, even though white poverty rates are lower than black and Latino 
poverty rates. Most of the poverty-based affirmative action slots will go to whites, by simple force of 
numbers.") (footnote omitted). 
190. See Rowan, supra note 128. 
191. See id. 
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this confession by state officials can help put to rest the popular notion that 
affirmative action is about lowering standards. Other positive lessons can 
be learned from California's premature abolishment of affirmative action. 
Perhaps the greatest cost of retreating from affirmative action js symbolic; 
the retreat sends a message to Blacks that White America is giving up on 
racial equality. This message is particularly harsh because White America 
has not offered alternative programs that will promote racial equality. The 
abolishment of affirmative action without a commitment to ending institu-
tional racism may be the ultimate expression of White denial-the ulti-
mate "throwing in the towel." Understandably, then, Black America hangs 
on to America's symbolic commitment to racial equality through affirma-
tive action because it offers hope, if little else, that the problem of institu-
tional racism will remain at the forefront of American politics. 
California's "failure" at abolishing affirmative action and maintaining 
a significant number of Black and Hispanic students in its public colleges 
and universities keeps racial equality in the news. It is a reminder that 
America must continue to struggle to achieve racial equality. Although 
affirmative action may not be the best solution to the problem of persistent 
racial inequality, abolishing it also is not the solution. Perhaps Califor-
nia's experience following Proposition 209 and the abolishment of af-
firmative action may be a catalyst to snap goodwill Whites out of their 
denial about racism. In tum, Black skepticism and racial anger will di-
minish. The need for affirmative action in every sense of the term can 
become the order of the day. Much needs to be done, and as bell hooks 
states, racial groups need to work together: 
It is our collective responsibility as people of color and as white 
people who are committed to ending white supremacy to help one 
another. It is our collective responsibility to educate for critical 
consciousness. If I commit myself politically to black liberation 
struggle, to the struggle to end white supremacy, I am notmaking 
a commitment to working only for and with black people; I must 
engage in struggle with all willing comrades to strengthen our 
awareness and our resistance. 192 
Presumably, if White people of goodwill understood how their anti-
affirmative action rhetoric is racist, they would be unable to oppose af-
firmative action. In other words, they no longer could rely on the privi-
lege of Whiteness in the allocation of public spaces. The following sec-
tion explores this in detail. •. 
192. HOOKS, supra note 4, at 194 (citing GEORGE BREITMAN, THE LAST YEAR OF MALCOLM X-THE 
EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTIONARY (1967); MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 
(1965)). 
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B. Exposing the Racism in Anti-Affirmative Action Rhetoric 
The rhetoric associated with affirmative action reflects opponents' 
efforts to shame potential beneficiaries into rejecting affirmative action. 
Specifically, opponents of affirmative action focus on two key aspects of 
the debate to persuade potential beneficiaries that it is shameful to support 
the programs. First, affirmative action has become synonymous with 
"lowering standards," and second, beneficiaries are admonished that par-
ticipating in affirmative action programs "stigmatizes" them. Yale law 
professor, Stephen Carter, capitulates to these arguments in his book Re-
flections of an Affirmative Action Baby, 193 and rightfully has been criti-
cized by other Black scholars.194 
1. The "Lowers Standards" Position 
The "lowering standards" position of affirmative action opponents 
originated with the Bakke Court's sanctioning the unique importance of 
standardized test scores to measure aptitude.195 Emphasizing standardized 
test scores as the perfect measurement of aptitude fails to acknowledge 
many legitimate and alternative ways it can be measured. Historically, 
scientists' measurements of intelligence focused primarily on math and 
verbal skills. Standardized exams, like I.Q. tests and the MCAT, measure 
these skills. In the 1980s, psychologist Howard Gardner of Harvard intro-
duced the concept of "multiple intelligences,"196 suggesting that math and 
verbal acuity play a limited role in measuring intelligence. Dr. Gardner's 
study led him to conclude that there are multiple ways to measure intelli-
gence, including an assessment of an individual's spatial capacity, kines-
thetic genius, musical gifts, and interpersonal skills. 197 
At the time of Mr. Bakke's application to Davis, admis::;ions officials 
were not aware of the undiscovered concept of multiple intelligences. 
Nevertheless, personal interviews always have served the ~>Urpose of high-
lighting qualities about an applicant that cannot be tested on an exam. In 
the context of a medical school interviewing process, it is impossible to 
conclude that White applicants who are interviewed and rejected are more 
qualified than minority applicants who are interviewed and accepted un-
193. STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991). 
194. See Charles E. Daye, On Blackberry Picking, Generations of Affirmative Action, and Less 
Dangerous Enterprises: An Open Letter to Stephen Carter, 45 STAN. L. REV. 485 (1993) (reviewing 
Carter, supra note 193). 
195. See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text. 
196. See DANIEL GoLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE THAN IQ 38 
(1995) (explaining the findings of Howard Gardener's study). I explore this in more detail in my 
article, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE I, 
21-24 (1997). 
197. See Rush, supra note 196, at 22 (citing GoLEMAN, supra note 196). 
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less the interview is irrelevant. It is illogical to suppose that if aptitude for 
medicine could only be measured by MCA T scores and GPAs that medical 
schools would incur the expense of and invest enormous time in an irrele-
vant process. Quite the contrary: the interview is an essential part of the 
process and can be given as much weight as officials want to give it. 
Admittedly, factoring in an applicant's race is more complicated. The 
Bakke Court held, in fact, that admitting someone based on race violates 
equality principles. 198 Simultaneously, the Court held that race could be a 
factor among many in public school admissions processes.199 Recall that 
the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood rejected this principle.200 
Admissions officials at public schools generally do not rely solely on 
numbers to select classes because even the numbers are not comparable 
from one applicant to the next. Personal statements, letters of recommen-
dation, descriptions of work experiences, and information about discipli-
nary actions or criminal records are also solicited from applicants. Given 
this, there is nothing startling about a school's rejection of a White appli-
cant with higher scores than applicants who are admitted. Nor should 
there be anything startling about a school's acceptance of a racial minority 
applicant with lower test scores. Yet not only is the latter situation star-
tling to White society, but it also is legally suspicious if the school has an 
affirmative action policy. 
This raises serious questions: Why would additional information be 
solicited from applicants if it were going to be ignored because only scores 
and grades mattered? More puzzling, why would reliance on additional 
information reflect a lowering of standards at all, and why is this conclu-
sion reached only with respect to racial minority applicants, but not White 
applicants, who are admitted with lower scores? Not only is it illogical to 
assume the additional information is solicited so it can be ignored, but it 
also is racist to assume the additional information is irrelevant only for 
racial minority applicants. 
2. The "Stigma" Position 
Closely related, opponents (and even some supporters201 ) of affirma-
tive action also posit that participation in such programs stigmatizes the 
beneficiaries. They suggest that beneficiaries would not have been ad-
198. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See supra note 165 for 
analysis of how the Justices voted. Cases since Bakke have concluded that policies that make race a 
determining factor in admissions decjsions in public schools offend the Constitution's guarantee of 
equal protection. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998). 
199. See id. 
200. See supra notes 171-173 and accompanying text. 
20 I. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal , Bakke 's Fate , 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1745, 1772 
(1996). 
--
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mitted to programs if they had belonged to majority groups. This criticism 
is usually cast in the pejorative way. Opponents of affirmative action sug-
gest that the only reason a state program accepts a minority candidate is 
because of the candidate's race, suggesting the candidate was not even 
remotely qualified. Again, this ignores the complexities inherent in mak-
ing admissions decisions. Officials and employers look for multiple quali-
fying characteristics of candidates and given the tough competition for 
placement in colleges and universities, it defies logic to suppose that ad-
missions officials admit unqualified minority applicants. As long as ap-
plicants are selected from the pool of qualified applicants, it is dishonest to 
suggest that only race mattered in the decision. 
Moreover, from the beneficiaries' perspectives, the stigma argument is 
disingenuous. But suppose it were true; that being an affirmative action 
beneficiary is stigmatizing. It would be equally true, however, that be-
longing to a group of people who are rarely, if ever, admitted into certain 
state programs also is stigmatizing. The absence of Blacks and other peo-
ple of color in many public spaces often seems to be interpreted by Whites 
as proof that the racial minorities are unqualified to occupy those spaces. 
In this way, beneficiaries of affirmative action can accept offers to hold 
public spaces and prove White society wrong, or they can refuse such of-
fers, let the spaces stay all White, and let White society continue to believe 
Blacks and people of color do not belong in public space. Between these 
choices, clearly shared racial space is the only choice. 
But the "lowering standards" and "stigma" arguments are even more 
disturbing than simply being disingenuous. They are rhetorical arguments 
created by White society to manipulate Blacks into rejecting affirmative 
action by making them feel ashamed to be affirmative action beneficiaries. 
Shame is a powerful psychological tool invoked by the "shamer" to dis-
honor or disgrace the "shamee." For example, governments use "shame" 
to strip people, usually criminals, of their human dignity by publicly hu-
miliating them for their criminal behavior.202 Many scholars debate 
whether it is "cruel" or otherwise morally appropriate to use "shame" as a · 
method of punishing criminals, which varies in different cultures.203 
Invoking shame in the affirmative action context should also cause 
concern and its use be even more questionable than it is in the criminal 
context. When opponents of affirmative action equate it with "lower stan-
dards," the Black beneficiary (the shamee) often retreats into a state of 
202. See generally James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, I 07 YALE 
L.J. 1055 (1998) (discussing examples of shame sanctions). 
203 . See id. See also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591 (1996) (arguing for shame sanctions); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal 
Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880 (1991) (arguing against shame sanctions). 
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self-doubt and embarrassment, while simultaneously the (usually White) 
opponent (the shamer) is exalted in intelligence and ability. The shamer is 
"above" the need for help and would never stoop to the low level of the 
shamee. Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, has shamingly noted that 
"[s]o-called 'benign' discrimination teaches many that because of chronic 
and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with 
them without their patronizing indulgence" and that affirmative action 
"stamp[s] minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to 
develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' to 
preferences."204 In essence, Justice Thomas believes he succeeded without 
any help from affirmative action205 and is puzzled that other Blacks cannot 
be as successful as he. In translation, the Black beneficiary is supposed to 
avoid the shame of affirmative action by not accepting the offer, or even 
better, by supporting the abolishment of affirmative action that resulted in 
the candidate's offer to occupy space that historically had been reserved 
for Whites. 
From a different perspective, however, it is not shameful to support 
and participate in programs that counteract a profound history of Black 
subordination, reflected in the power of White privilege to this day. Af-
firmative action merely helps to balance the scales that are so heavily 
weighted in favor of Whites. White people of goodwill who understand 
this naturally would insist on the removal of the White thumb of privilege 
on the scales of justice. Moreover, while there is no shame in being a vic-
tim of persistent racial subordination, Professor bell hooks also admon-
ishes that situating Black identity only in victimization denies agency.206 
Denouncing the shaming rhetoric of affirmative action, making White 
society confront the reality of racial inequality, and demanding that White 
society confront its racism are empowering acts that manifest Black 
agency. 
Thus, affirmative action is stigmatizing only because Whites say it is. 
Through the "lowering standards" and "stigma" shaming arguments, op-
ponents of affirmative action lay a trap for the unwary person, Black or 
White. This is how the opponents of affirmative action have persuaded 
goodwill Whites and even some Blacks, like Stephen Carter, Justice 
204. Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, SIS U.S. 200,241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
205. It is unlikely that Justice Thomas has succeeded without any help from affinnative action. 
Most people would agree that when President Bush appointed Justice Thomas to replace the first and 
only other Black ever to serve on th;. Supreme Court (Justice Thurgood Marshall), that even Bush, a 
Republican rhetorically opposed to affinnative action, was likely influenced by an affinnative 
decision to continue Black representation on the Court. See Sharon E. Rush, Understanding 
Affirmative Action: One Feminist's Perspective, in AN ETHICAL EDUCATION: COMMUNITY AND 
MORALITY IN THE MULTICULTURAL UNIVERSITY 195, 225 n.87 (M.N.S. Sellers, ed. 1994). 
206. See HOOKS, supra note 4, at 58. 
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Clarence Thomas, Shelby Steele/07 and Ward Connerly,208 to mention a 
few, to join the team. 
Most Blacks resist these rhetorical "put downs," which can be char-
acterized as modern support for the historical precept of Black inferiority. 
Nevertheless, simply having to counter this increasingly popular view of 
affirmative action is demoralizing. Anyone who is constantly and publicly 
"put down" suffers emotionally and justifiably resents being placed in a 
compromising position between self-affirmation and self-doubt. 
White people of goodwill, naturally, would not condone this shaming 
rhetoric if they understood it was a mask for the "Black inferiority" theory. 
For this reason, more concern should be given to its impact on Black chil-
dren and whether it harms them in ways similar to types of emotional 
abuse. In fact, the anti-affirmative action position of many White people 
of goodwill is premised on a paternalistic need to warn Blacks of the 
stigma associated with affirmative action. In their paternalistic way, 
goodwill Whites do not want Blacks to suffer the indignity of affirmative 
action stigma which would not be possible if affirmative action were 
abolished. However, on realizing that it is they who promote the stigma 
and inflict the shame and pain, they also must realize that to continue to do 
it makes them co-conspirators with the "real" racists who unabashedly 
promote White Supremacy. The only way to avoid this disjunction is to 
stop promoting these arguments and to start exposing the racism in them. 
C. Exposing the Racism in Affirmative Action Challenges 
White people of goodwill, by definition, are not (consciously) racist 
and are not individually responsible for racism. Above, we explored how 
this promotes White denial and translates into a general passivity ·by 
goodwill Whites on race issues, except in situations where they think 
color-blindness is violated.209 
Generally, the law does not impose a duty on individuals to help end 
racism or even to refrain from discrimination on the basis of race.210 The 
207. See SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 
(1990). 
208. Ward Connerly is the author of Proposition 209 banning affirmative action in California 
public schools' admissions and is trying to do the same in other states, including Florida. See David 
Nitkin, Bush Opposes Vote on Affirmative Action: Ward Connerly is Considering a Ballot Initiative in 
Florida Similar to California 's Proposition 209, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 22, 1999 at D4. 
209. See supra Part IIA. 
210. Two important exceptions are the employment and public accommodations laws. See Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a): 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(!) to fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
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law imposes this duty only on the government, or on certain individuals 
who engage in specific types of commerce.211 Nevertheless, White indi-
viduals can play significant roles in shaping the future of race relations. 
For example, as we just explored, a decision to expose the racism in the 
rhetoric of anti-affirmative action debates reflects a deeper appreciation of 
the whole dynamic of institutional racism. This also is some evidence that 
parts of White society are moving beyond denial, which makes Blacks less 
skeptical, and removes one "anger" issue from public discourse. 
Another significant step Whites can take to help society achieve more 
formal racial equality is to oppose efforts to abolish affirmative action 
through propositions, constitutional amendments, and court challenges. 
Recall that affirmative action was created because of the growing disso-
nance between White privilege and Black subordination. Because Black 
subordination is no longer a problem in White society's eyes, White soci-
ety now wants to eliminate tension between its goodwill and its (uncon-
scious) White privilege. Consequently, the sentiment for Bakke-type suits 
like Ms. Hopwood's, and propositions like California's Proposition 209212 
has only grown since the 1970s. 
It is possible to argue that affirmative action policies are fair or unfair 
depending on one's perspective.213 Mr. Bakke and Ms. Hopwood probably 
sincerely believed they had been treated unfairly by Davis and Texas, re-
spectively. As Professor Rubenfeld reminds us, law is only partly about 
fairness and particular decisions may be fair only to parts of society.214 
Given this reality, the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guaran-
tee, at a minimum, would seem to require that Whites share equally in 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a): "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation ... without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or 
national origin." 
211. For an insightful discussion of the state action doctrine, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503 (1985). 
212. California Proposition 209 amended the California Constitution to prohibit the use of race-
based and gender-based affirmative action programs in public employment, public education, and 
public contracting. See CAL. CONST., art. I , § 31. 
213 . See Rubenfeld, supra note 180, at 456: 
Affirmative action surely is unfair to whites, sharply and deeply so. But there is a peculiar 
notion at work in the conventional moral case for and against affirmative action's consti-
tutionality. Those who argue that affirmative action is unfair and therefore unconstitu-
tional--or moral and therefore constitutional-seem to think the rest of the legal system 
would not have to be radically overhauled if constitutional law condemned all govern-
mental unfairness. , •· 
Cf Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1293, 1342 (exploring role of "virtue" in 
"rescu[ing] the meaning of [B]lack citizenship from the deformed characterizations of American law 
found in cases such as Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson") (footnotes omitted). 
214. See Rubenfeld, supra note 180, at 456 ("Our society is massively unfair .... But constitutional 
law is not moral philosophy, and unfairness is not unconstitutionality."). 
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bearing some of the unfairness. 
At present, society operates largely on the unstated assumption that 
White privilege is the "fairness" standard. It may be that the Bakke Court 
was not ready to handle the intellectual challenge posed by "benign" race 
cases, which came at a time when the Court had struggled and struggled 
with dismantling racial segregation. For example, the Justices failed to 
agree on the basic question of the level of review that applies in benign 
race cases.215 Indeed, the Court debated this issue until 1995 when it held 
that strict scrutiny applies in all race cases.216 
An evaluation of Davis' policy reveals that the medical school was not 
interested in denying admission to qualified White applicants, but rather 
the school was interested in increasing the likelihood that historically ex-
cluded and qualified minority applicants were admitted. The Court's fail-
ure to acknowledge this significant difference resulted in "backward" rea-
soning as evidenced in hindsight by the Court's 1992 decision in United 
States v. Fordice. 2 17 
In Fordice, the Court held it was unconstitutional for Mississippi pub-
lic colleges and universities to rely exclusively on the American College 
Testing Program (the "ACT") in their admissions.218 When Mississippi 
adopted the ACT in its admissions policy in 1963, Whites scored an aver-
age of 18 and Blacks scored an average of 7 on the exam.219 As a result, 
Blacks were automatically rejected from the predominantly White colleges 
and universities.220 
Black plaintiffs alleged that exclusive reliance on the ACT discrimi-
nated against them because the exams were admittedly biased, which re-
sulted in the colleges remaining unlawfully segregated.221 In fact, the For-
dice Court emphasized that Mississippi adopted the ACT requirement with 
the intent of remaining segregated, as its school had been under de jure 
segregation, because officials knew Blacks scored lower than Whites on it 
215. Five justices (Rehnquist, Stevens, Stewart, Chief Justice Burger, and Powell) held the set-
aside policy unlawful under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. See Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 281 , 307 n.44 (1978). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist therefore 
concluded that they did not need to reach the question of the level of review that applies in benign 
race cases. See id. Four justices (Brennan, White, Marshall , and Blackmun) upheld the policy, 
applying intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 359. Complicating matters, Justice Powell joined with the 
majority to hold that the analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI is identical and held 
that strict scrutiny should apply. See id. at 291 (Powell , J ., concurring). 
216. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
217. 505 U.S. 717 (1992). See generally Sharon E. Rush, Beyond Admissions: Racial Equality in 
Law Schools, 48 U. FLA. L. REv. 373, 393-94 (1996). 
218. See id. at 737-38. 
219. See id. at 734-35 . 
220. See id. 
221. See id. at 723 . 
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and set a cut-off score accordingly.222 The Court held that Mississippi's 
admissions policies violated equal protection and ordered the school to 
look at other indicia and not only ACT scores to evaluate an applicant's 
ability to succeed.223 By taking other factors into account, the Court was 
persuaded that the schools would become shared racial spaces.224 
Admittedly, U. C. Davis' admissions policy did not rely exclusively 
on MCAT scores in making admissions decisions; interviews, among other 
things, were critically important. Nor is there any suggestion in therecord 
that Davis historically relied on MCA T scores to the extent that it did for 
the purpose of excluding racial minorities. In this way, Bakke is different 
from Fordice, but does or should this difference make them distinguish-
able as a matter of constitutional law? 
Consider the corollaries to these points, which may be more signifi-
cant in discrimination analysis: Davis looked at other indicia in addition to 
MCA T scores to assess medical aptitude for all applicants, particularly 
applicants in the set-aside admissions process. Officials did not do this for 
the purpose of excluding all White applicants. Nor was this the effect of 
the set-aside policy because 84 spaces continued to be occupied (reserved 
for) by Whites. Significantly, Davis relied on multiple qualifying factors 
in order to create shared racial space, the goal Mississippi was expected to 
achieve by relying on multiple qualifying factors as ordered by the Court. 
Ironically, as Davis voluntarily set out to create shared racial space in its 
medical school in the late 1960s, within five or six years the Supreme 
Court was on it for treating Whites unfairly. In contrast, Mississippi 
craftily and disgracefully escaped its obligation under Brown to treat 
Blacks equally, and got away with it well into the 1990s even though its 
discrimination was intentionally undertaken to keep public colleges and 
universities involuntarily reserved spaces for Whites only. The court-
ordered remedy in Fordice was exactly what Davis voluntarily tried to do. 
Thus, an essential key to dismantling institutional racism, the heart of 
Brown, is to create ways to shift some of the unfairness of exclusive prac-
tices to White society as the Fordice Court appreciated. During the im-
mediate demise of Jim Crow, sharing space with Blacks made Whites un-
comfortable, but the Justice Department and the Supreme Court held 
fast-at least until Bakke when the Court started to equivocate. Similarly, 
the Davis plan and other affirmative action programs shift a modest part of 
the racial inequality burden onto White society by slightly diminishing the 
privilege of Whiteness. Astoundingly, this makes White people of good-
will angry and leads to charges of unfairness resulting in ballot initiatives 
222. See id. at 734-35. 
223. See id. at 737-38. 
224. See id. at 742. 
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and lawsuits. 
Refraining from bringing and opposing "reverse discrimination" suits 
can be seen as a step toward becoming a "race traitor," to use Noel lgna-
tiev's term.225 Specifically, he encourages anti-racists (people of goodwill) 
to become active abolitionists and believes White privilege can be under-
mined if"a minority [of whites is] willing to undertake outrageous acts of 
provocation, aware that they will incur the opposition of many who might 
agree with them if they adopted a more moderate approach."226 It may be 
that Mr. lgnatiev would think opposing "reverse discrimination" suits is 
not outrageous enough to constitute treason to White privilege, but imag-
ine what race relations discourse might be without the anti-affirmative 
action rhetoric and sentiment reinforced in cases like Hopwood. If Mr. 
Bakke and Ms. Hopwood (and other Whites who are rejected from state 
programs) had not sued, perhaps more racial equality would have been 
achieved in those and other public schools. 
A decision to forego a Bakke-type lawsuit227 or Bakke-type initiative 
reflects a deeper understanding of the dynamics of institutional racism. It 
bears repeating that this deeper understanding of racism as reflected in 
White support for affirmative action pierces the veil of White denial, re-
duces Black skepticism, and breaks the cycle of anger. It gives society 
room for joint and creative problem solving on race issues, particularly the 
problem of how to create shared racial space. 
D. Sharing Racial Space: Repudiating Privilege in all Areas 
I. Generally 
Whites can repudiate privilege by sharing space where people of all 
races participate as equals. I focus on law school dean searches because I 
am familiar with the process, but suggest the analysis can be extrapolated 
to other contexts. The purpose of working through an example is to sug-
gest that the act of repudiating privilege is not always so far-fetched as to 
be preposterous. 
Consider the law school community that has winnowed its dean search 
to a short list of candidates that includes at least one person of color. Can-
didates who make the short list are qualified for the position and the final 
selection typically turns on more subjective criteria like personality 
225 . Noel lgnatiev & John Garvey, Editorial: When Does the Unreasonable Act Make Sense?, in 
RACE TRAITOR 35, 36-37 {N. lgnatiev & J. Garvey eds., 1996). 
226. !d. 
227. Some litigants argue that affirmative action should focus on economic disadvantage and not 
race. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). But 
see Malamud, supra note 189 (critiquing economic-based affirmative action). 
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matches between the candidates and the President, Provosts, alumni, and 
others who will be working with the dean. Naturally, top administrators 
who will supervise the dean want to select someone they respect and 
someone who will make a good "team player." This aspect of the hiring 
decision is important and can be crucial to the school's ability to make 
progress under the new dean's administration. 
Understandably, a subjective focus on hiring law school deans all too 
often results in maintaining the "good old boy" network. As a factor of 
human nature, people prefer to work with people who are like them.221 
Professor Charles Lawrence has described this as the "mirror, mirror, on 
the wall, who's the fairest of them all?" phenomenon.229 Translated from 
its fairy-tale mode by Professor Stephanie Wildman, she suggests that 
people who are considering applicants for job vacancies focus on answer-
ing these questions: "Will this person fit into our group, fit into our insti-
tution? Will this person change it in any way that will make me not fit, or 
hurt my place in the institution in any way? If someone comes who is not 
like me, will I still be valued at this place, at other places, or have other 
opportunities?"230 
Historically, law schools have been enclaves for Whites and men.231 
Blacks, people of other colors, and women generally were absent in law 
schools and law practice until the 1960s and 1970s. Today, people of 
color and women have made modest gains toward equal citizenship in 
law/32 but they continue to suffer negative effects of resistance to their 
presence in the academy.233 
228. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Licensing Laws: A Historical Example of the Used of 
Government Regulatory Power Against African-Americans, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 89, 97 (1994) 
(discussing how plumbers ' groups wanted to stay racially segregated but regulations prohibited their 
choices). 
229. Stephanie Wildman, The Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, in PRIVILEGE 
REVEALED, supra note 5, at 109 (thanking Charles Lawrence for making this analogy from the fairy 
tale to faculty hiring in law schools). 
230. /d. 
231. See Richard H. Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law 
School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 537 (1988). 
232. See generally Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The 
Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 199 (1997) (reporting 
findings from the first comprehensive empirical study of the role of sex and race in tenure-track hiring 
at accredited law schools). 
233 . See, e.g. , Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: 
Finding the Me in the Legal Academ:Jt,. in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 409 (Richard 
Delgado ed. 1995); Deborah Waire Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity, and Morality, in CRITICAL 
RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra, at 419; Jennifer M. Russell, On Being A Gorilla in Your 
Midst, or, The Life of One Blackwoman in the Legal Academy, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE 
CUTTING EDGE, supra, at 498 (all describing ways the authors have struggled to "fit into" the 
academy and maintain their identities). 
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2. Institutional Responses 
Because law school is predominantly a White and male environment, 
people of color and women who aspire to be deans must overcome institu-
tional biases against them. Often it is uncomfortable (not just less com-
fortable) for Whites and men to work (or imagine working) with a Black 
dean, a woman dean, and especially a Black woman dean. For example, in 
a similar context, my university selected a new president almost ten years 
ago. The Board of Regents narrowed the list to a Black woman and a 
White man.234 For days, the entire state of Florida was absorbed with the 
selection and the media maximized public interest by portraying the search 
as if it were a horse race and the candidates were neck-in-neck to the finish 
line.235 When the Chancellor selected the White man to be president, the 
community was not surprised and, in fact, many people seemed to be re-
lieved. The Chancellor' s public comment about what the "deciding fac-
tor" was between the two candidates was quite telling. As he stated, 
"Anybody that drives a red pickup truck will do okay in Florida."236 
Unmasked, the Chancellor's message translated into an understanding 
that the White man was "one of them" and the Black woman was not. The 
red pickup truck ostensibly made him uniquely attractive. Ownership of a 
pickup truck told everyone he is a rugged, aggressive, and hardworking 
man. A red pickup truck added the impression that he was progressive, 
bold, independent, and a standout. Ironically, it was not the new presi-
dent's unique personality that made him more attractive to the Chancellor 
and Board, mostly White men. Rather, the new president's red pickup 
truck symbolized his institutional personality, a personality with which the 
Chancellor and Board members could identify. 
Despite the media coverage that made the selection process seem 
close, in reality, it reflected years of institutional preferences for Whites 
and men in top university positions. In the final days before the Chancel-
lor's announcement, many papers reported that alumni were growing con-
cerned that the Black woman might be selected.237 After all, the University 
was "an affirmative action, equal opportunity employer," holding out the 
promise that "all things being equal," the woman or minority would be 
hired. Apparently, "things" weren't that equal as reflected in some of the 
embarrassingly racist and sexist comments that were printed in various 
234. See Sue Landry, Praise For UF Finalists Stacks Up Evenly, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 15, 
1989, at 58, available in LEXIS, News Library, Stpete File. 
235. See id. 
236. Sue Landry, Lombardi Picked For UF Presidency, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 15, 1989, at 
IB, available in LEXIS, News Library, Stpete File. 
237. See The Call of the Bull Gator, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 8, 1989, at 16A, available in 
LEXIS, News Library, Stpete File. 
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Florida newspapers. These included, "[W]hat some [alumni] most par-
ticularly do not want is a new president who is female and black;"238 [The 
Black woman's] "gender and race are 'an issue that concerns many peo-
ple; '"239 and "Some alumni have said a she would have problems dealing 
with UF's old-boy network."240 The ultimate selection of the White man 
restored goodwill comfort. 
Today, it is unlikely that people would openly express their feelings 
about a candidate in such biased ways. Yet, the chances a law school will 
hire a minority or woman dean continue to be relatively small.241 It is not 
uncommon, for example, for a school to re-open a search when there is a 
chance that a minority or a women will be selected, although this would 
never be the expressed reason for taking that action.242 Moreover, the in-
stitutional preferences for Whites and men in top management positions is 
a nationwide phenomenon and is not limited to law schools. It reflects the 
lack of formal equality talked about earlier.243 
However, decisions to include racial minorities in power structures 
promote the important ideals of equality and democracy. Educational in-
stitutions are perceived to be the guardians of truth and their missions are 
to find the truth. All racial and ethnic voices need to participate in this 
search to avoid a superficial commitment to equality that breeds distrust, 
causes res_entment, and feeds the cycle of denial, skepticism, and anger. 
The symbolic and practical importance of having university leaders of all 
colors notifies a state's citizenry that the university is open to them, wel-
comes them, and values their participation in "searches for the truth," a 
university's primary enterprise and one they are entitled to construct and 
mold as equal citizens. This enhances the university's integrity and credi-
bility by adhering to these ideals in practice as well as in theory. 
Multi-racial leadership can be a highly successful marketing strategy 
for progressive-minded public universities who imagine participating in 
significant ways in tomorrow's increasingly multi-racial world.244 Profes-
238. id. 
239. Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Understanding Diversity, 42 FLA. L. REv. I, 7 n.25 (1990) (quoting 
Evans, Chancellor Very influential in Presidential Choice, INDEP. FLA. ALLIGATOR, Nov. 13, 1989, at 
5 (internal citations omitted)). 
240. Rush, supra note 239, (quoting Lazo, Regents Decide to Hire UF President Tuesday, MIAMI 
HERALD, Nov. 9, 1989, at 26A (emphasis added)). 
241. See Jagdeep S. Bhandari et al ., Who Are These People? An Empirical Profile of the Nation's 
Law School Deans, 48 J. LEGAL Eouc. 329 (1998). 
242. I probably will never find any v::otten support for this and, in completely unorthodox fashion, 
want to cite to the "good old girls" network for this one. I bet the same information also circulates in 
the "good old boys" network. 
243. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. 
244. See Michael K. Frisby, White House Reworks Troubled Race initiative As President Heads for 
a Town Meeting in Ohio, WALL ST. J. , Dec. 3, 1997, at A24 (America's population in I 995 was 74% 
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sor Shipley's research illustrates an example of this strategic approach by 
the management at Simon & Schuster: 
At Simon & Schuster, the publishing house, special attention to 
hiring and training a diverse staff has been given in the large unit 
that publishes textbooks for middle and high schools ... To appeal 
to the diverse clientele who will buy and use the texts ... the com-
pany 'makes sure books are reviewed by a wide variety of review-
ers, that products reflect a multicultural experience, that they try to 
hire from a multicultural point ofview.'24s 
It makes business and educational sense for all public schools to follow 
Simon & Schuster's policy of promoting multiculturalism. In tum, com-
munities of color and progressive Whites will want to become affiliated 
with the university that is taking such progressive steps. Creativity and 
growth come with deliberate moves away from inequality. 
3. Individual Responses 
Individuals also can participate in creating shared racial space. Per-
haps one of the most personal and direct ways an individual voice for ra-
cial equality can be heard is for the individual to refrain from competing 
with Blacks in appropriate circumstances. Each individual has to evaluate 
when it is appropriate to sacrifice a personal goal in the struggle for racial 
equality.246 Relying on individual efforts may seem like an inefficient way 
to dismantle White privilege. As Mr. lgnatiev responds to the question, 
"How many will it take," he answers: 
No one can say for sure. It is a bit like the problem of currency: 
how much counterfeit money has to circulate in order to destroy 
the value of the official currency? The answer is, nowhere near a 
majority-just enough to undermine public confidence in the offi-
cial stuff. When it comes to abolishing the white race, the task is 
not to win over more whites to oppose 'racism'; there are 'anti-
racists ' enough already to do the job.247 
With that understanding, my hypothetical is offered as a way to explore 
what it can mean for an individual to repudiate White privilege. This ex-
ploration offers a plausible perspective on the concept of repudiating 
White privilege. 
White, 12% Black, 3% Asian, and 10% Hispanic. By 2050, the population is projected to be 51% 
White, 14% Black, 8% Asian, and 26% Hispanic.). 
245. SHIPLER, supra note 24, at 496-97 (quoting Michael Carroll, vice president for human 
resources). 
246. See Wildman & Davis, supra noteS, at 16-17. 
247. lgnatiev & Garvey, supra note 225, at 36-37. 
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Return to the situation where a dean search narrows to the fmal list, 
including at least one person of color. Suppose all the White candidates 
withdrew from consideration to eliminate the institutional preferences for 
them. In the context of repudiating White privilege, what have they sacri-
ficed? 
People who think it is implausible that a candidate would withdraw 
from consideration to avoid competing with Blacks and other people of 
color focus on the decision in terms of what the individual loses: the 
chance to be dean at the particular law school, prestige, career advance-
ment, salary increase, enhanced self-esteem, new challenges, and so forth. 
The implausibility question surfaces: "Why would anyone voluntarily give 
that up, especially to help in some abstract principle like racial equality?" 
Some people who make personal sacrifices for racial equality are · moti-
vated by altruism; they enjoy giving to others even when they feel no obli-
gation to do so.248 For others, however, the answer to the implausibility 
question is that they do not give up opportunities in situations like these 
because it seems too much to ask of anyone. Even if repudiating privilege 
were a matter of altruism, to drop out of contention for a job stretches the 
concept of altruism beyond realistic boundaries for many people. 
From a different perspective, what can be learned about repudiating 
privilege by asking this question: "What does a candidate retain when he 
or she withdraws from a job search?" Candidates who make final lists for 
law deanships are especially bright, energetic, capable people who hold 
powerful and prestigious legal jobs. Some may be full-tenured professors; 
some may be partners in successful law firms; and others may be highly 
successful business leaders. When Whites withdraw from consideration in 
searches where Blacks have made the fmallist with them, they continue to 
hold extremely privileged positions in society. Moreover, there will be 
other dean searches, perhaps equally or even more attractive ones where 
there are no Blacks in the final list. Repudiating White privilege in this 
context may seem less implausible. 
Naturally, Blacks who are not offered deanships also retain immense 
privilege, raising the question, why is it "fair" for Whites to step-aside? 
Whites who voluntarily step-aside in appropriate circumstances draw on 
their goodwill commitment to racial equality. Significantly, Whites who 
repudiate privilege act consistently with their goodwill toward others. 
Their actions break the cycle of White denial because their repudiations 
evidence their understanding of White privilege and their need to give up 
• '" 
248. For a discussion of altruism in law, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in 
Lawyering, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 385 (1992). See also Michelle S. Jacobs, Pro Bono Work and 
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what they wrongly inherited. In turn, their act of repudiating White privi-
lege reduces Black skepticism. The advancement of Blacks' formal 
equality reduces some of the racial anger. 
The impact one. White person who repudiates privilege can have on a 
particular law school environment potentially can be dramatic. For exam-
ple, the individual's action might result in a law school hiring its first 
Black dean, an historical event. As law schools hire more Black deans, 
they also will be more likely to advance into other administrative positions 
beyond deanships. Admittedly, a law school might re-open a search if the 
Whites drop-out, but that reverts to the institutional responses to White 
privilege. The individual act of repudiation is significant and should not 
be understated; repudiating one's role in supporting institutional racism 
reflects a profound commitment to racial equality. 
V . SUMMARY 
Until I became the mother of a Black daughter, my fights against ra-
cism were largely academic and abstract. My pre-daughter days are not 
that long ago, and so I can remember what it felt like to be a moderate 
White, as Martin Luther King described me-the goodwill White as I call 
myself. I felt good, I felt noble, I felt like I was doing something meaning-
ful with my life to help end racism because I was a law professor who 
taught about race. 
As the mother of a Black child, I have learned that racism is not aca-
demic and the solutions to ending it are not hidden in yet to be discovered 
interpretations of the Constitution. I cannot leave racism at the office any 
more. It is a constant part of my life even though I am not Black. 
Loving across the color line, I am beginning to understand what it 
means to be Black in White America. My experiences tell me racism is 
beyond my comprehension, in part because I am not Black; in part because 
it is so irrational. I can state unequivocally, however, that if Whites were 
to cross the color line and develop meaningful and caring relationships 
with Blacks, racial justice would happen. Whites could not bear racism as 
I know it, let alone as my daughter and other Blacks know it. 
The profound significance of this observation highlights how impossi-
ble it is for most Blacks to understand Whites' resistance to embarrass-
ingly modest efforts like affirmative action to achieve some formal racial 
equality. At best, supporting affirmative action is a modest step toward 
the color line and supporting it serves several important purposes. First, 
Professor Jeb Rubenfeld's quotation at the beginning of this section de-
scribes affirmative action accurately; it isn't a cure-all, but it does some 
good. It allows for more formal racial equality than would exist without it. 
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Moreover, anti-affirmative action rhetoric is chocked full of racism nug-
gets. If Whites of goodwill understood this, it would be impossible for 
them to support the abolishment of such a modest attempt to counteract 
the power of White privilege unless they abandon their goodwill toward 
Blacks. In the larger context, White society must continue to take af-
firmative steps to equalize the racial imbalance in America, or give up its 
image as an anti-racist society altogether. Thus far, affirmative action 
reflects the only effort by White society to create shared racial space. 
EPILOGUE 
The evening after softball practice, Mary and I had a long talk about 
what had happened with the Coach. She wanted to know why he was so 
mean to her. Whenever I hold her, I am taken aback at how small and 
fragile she is. Her eyes are so black one cannot see her ''peeples" as she 
would say, but their blackness cannot hide the pain and confusion of being 
mistreated She still has the innocent face of a young girl, eager to take in 
all that life has to offer-always expecting the best of everyone. Although 
she feels the hurt of racism, she is not old enough always to understand 
what is happening to her and why. 
We talked about quitting the team. It was hard for me, as an adult and 
a White person of goodwill, to imagine seeing any of those people again. I 
could feel the pull toward comfort; accepting the Coach's invitation to 
quit was alluring. I rationalized: Why should she have to endure his dis-
dain? On the other hand, I have learned from being her mother that I 
must teach her how to cope with unfairness, because it is too much a part 
of her life not to confront it. Accordingly, I tried to focus my daughter on 
the future. I told her that there would be many times in her life when peo-
ple would try to divert her from her goals. In some ways, it did not matter 
why the Coach did what,)te did. I tried to help her see that what was im-
portant was how she responded to him. Would she quit or stay? 
We went through the reasons for quitting. I told her I would not blame 
her if she decided to quit because she had been treated unfairly. It was 
only a game and there would be other softball seasons. She could even 
join another softball team or participate in other sports. Quitting made 
some sense, I assured her. 
But I also stressed that she had worked the entire season for the team, 
had made many friends, and was only a few games away from being un-
defeated. How would she fe.el if she walked away from all that? She de-
served to finish the season as part of the winning team she had helped 
create. "Don't let the Coach or anyone else take that away from you, if 
that's what you really want, " was my motherly advice. I told her to think 
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about it for a few days and assured her I would support her decision. 
She decided to stay on the team and finish the season. Believe me, 
going to the next practice was not easy. I could see how apprehensive she 
was and !fully expected we would be shunned. Fortunately, I was wrong. 
The girls picked up right where they left off, and probably had forgotten 
everything that happened three days earlier. Young children can be so 
"here and now" in their orientation to life. And to my amazement, a few 
other parents were solicitous of me and actually sat with me in the bleach-
ers. The Coach also was very friendly toward Mary and showed more 
interest in her than he had all season. None of us talked about that after-
noon, but I was relieved the Coach and other parents had welcomed her 
back. 
Mary's trophy and team picture from the season sit on our living room 
shelf, a reminder of the small triumph of one little eight-year-old Black 
girl who is learning to cope with racial inequality. When the Coach called 
at the start of the next season to ask her to join the team, however, Mary 
decided she did not want to play. Fair enough, I thought. I heard her tell 
the Coach over the phone, "Thank you for asking, but I want to play soc-
cer this year. " In the end, she held fast to her dignity. 
Mary learned an invalua_ble lesson from the footrace incident, but she 
also taught the Coach, other parents, and me something, too. The Coach 
and parents may be more sensitive to racial differences because of that 
afternoon. As for me, I am learning day after day what an incredible 
strength it takes for my daughter and all people of color to survive the 
challenge of racism. 249 White privilege is like a cobweb-a sticky anath-
ema to humanity. Some days, I wish I could get away from the struggle, 
take a break, let my guard down, sleep peacefully. But racism shapes my 
daughter's life and now mine, just as it shapes the lives of every Black 
person and every White person who loves them or cares der:p!y about ra.;. 
cism enough to understand the need to repudiate White privilege. Refuge 
from racism is rare and only temporary for now. Someday, perhaps White 
people of goodwill will ensure a safe and equal America for our children 
by repudiating their own privilege and affirmatively acting to create 
shared racial space. 
* * * 
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